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Comment
The Handicapped Child Has a
Right to an Appropriate Education
"Unlike many other animals, man does not abandon his handi-
capped offspring. Rather he shelters him, hopes for him, dreams
for him, and loves him."'
I. INTRODUCTION
During the 1970s proponents of the handicapped 2 child's right to
a publicly funded education made progress in a series of landmark
1. Roos, Rights Litigation-A View from the Private Sector, in U.S.
DEP'T or HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, THE RIGHTS OF THE
MENTALLY HANDICAPPED: PROCEEDINGS FROM A Bi-REGIONAL CONFER-
ENCE 33 (June 14-16, 1972).
2. Although "handicapped" encompasses the physically, emotionally, and
mentally disabled, in this comment the term will refer only to those
children who are mentally handicapped because of cerebral lesions.
Throughout this discussion, the terms "handicapped" and "excep-
tional" are used interchangeably. In this context, an "exceptional"
child is one whose learning ability is below normal. A child may also
be referred to as "educationally handicapped," or as an "educable
mental retardate" ("EMR"). The former category includes the child
who is brain-damaged. For him, the learning processes that are influ-
enced by the damaged area of the brain do not develop, while other
skills apparently develop normally. Until his problem is properly as-
sessed, this child cannot be educated appropriately. In today's educa-
tional jargon, he is "learning disabled." Often he is the handicapped
child most neglected by the educational system, because his problem
may remain forever undiagnosed or misunderstood, or both. In com-
parison, the EMR child learns progressively, but at a depressed rate.
The terms "mild," "moderate," "severe," and "profound," though
not used in this comment, describe levels of mental retardation deter-
mined by considering both "measured intelligence" and "impairment
in adaptive behavior."
Children who are classified as mildly retarded (frequently
called "educable mentally retarded" by educators), although
limited in their potentials for advanced academic achieve-
ment, can usually be brought by special education techniques
to a state of self-sufficiency as adults. Moderately retarded
children show a rate of mental development which is less than
half of that normally expected, but can nevertheless learn to
take care of their personal needs and perform many useful
tasks in the home or in a sheltered working situation. The se-
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cases.3 Despite this litigational achievement, however, the future
promises increased efforts toward the goal of public education for
the handicapped. These efforts may include lobbying for proper
legislation 4 to implement the court decrees and resorting to further
verely retarded can learn self-care, but their potential econo-
mic productivity is limited.
The profoundly retarded also respond to training in basic
self-care, and they additionally profit from special training in
such areas as behavior control, self-protection, language de-
velopment, and physical mobility.
NAT'L Ass'N FOR RETARDED CHILDREN, FACTS ON MENTAL RETARDATION
4 (1971).
The following chart provides estimates of the number of retarded
individuals in this country, based on age and degree of impairment.
The statistics cast light on the enormity of the problem of providing
services to handicapped, school-aged children.
Under
1970 Census All Ages 21 Years
General Population 203.2 million 80.5 million
Retarded
Profound (IQ 0-20) 92 thousand 36 thousand
About 1%%
Severe (IQ 20-35) 214 thousand 84 thousand
About 3 %
Moderate (IQ 36-52) 366 thousand 144 thousand
About 6%
Mild (IQ 53 +) 5.4 million + 2.1 million +
About 89% of the
retarded
Id. at 15.
3. Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F.
Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), and 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Mills
v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Diana v. State Bd.
of Educ., Civil No. C-70 37 RFP (N.D. Cal., Jan. 7, 1970 and June 18,
1973); Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Stewart
v. Phillips, Civil No. 70-1199-F (D. Mass., filed Sept. 14, 1970); Wyatt
v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, remanded
in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th
Cir. 1974).
4. In 1971, 899 bills dealing with education for the handicapped were in-
troduced in state legislatures; 237 were enacted into law. MENTAL
HEALTH LAW PROJEcT, BASIC RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED 49
(1973).
The most notable achievement has been Tennessee's enactment of
the major provisions of the Model Compulsory School Attendance
Law:
It is the policy of this state to provide, and to require school
districts to provide, as an integral part of free school educa-
tion, special education services sufficient to meet the needs
and maximize the capabilities of handicapped children. ...
This section applies to all handicapped children regardless of
the schools, institutions or programs by which such children
are served.
TENN. CODE ANNOT. § 49-2912 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
To the maximum extent practicable, handicapped children
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litigation when judicial mandates are not implemented. However,
the major challenge will lie in defining what is an appropriate edu-
cation for such a child and in ensuring that he receive such an op-
portunity.
In focusing on what is an appropriate education, this comment
discusses this newly evolving area of the law, first setting out its
historical background, including the case law and statutes that in
the past were interpreted as justifying the state's exclusion of
handicapped children from the public school system. Next consid-
ered is the socio-legal milieu in which there has been judicial
resolution of whether, under the Constitution, such exclusion could
occur. Although this question has been answered, an exami-
,nation of the prominent decisions is helpful in that should a state
fail to bring its educational scheme for the handicapped into consti-
tutional compliance, resort to the judiciary will be necessary and
those legal arguments and analyses, which have proven suc-
cessful, again will be utilized.5  Furthermore, lessons are to be
shall be educated along with children who do not have handi-
caps and shall attend regular classes. Impediments to learn-
ing and to the normal functioning of handicapped children in
the regular school environment shall be overcome by the pro-
vision of special aids and services rather than by separate
schooling for the handicapped .... [S]pecial classes, sepa-
rate schooling or other removal of handicapped children from
the regular educational environment, shall occur only when,
and to the extent that the nature of severity of the handicap is
such that education in regular classes, even with the use of
supplementary aids and services, cannot be accomplished sat-
isfactorily.
Id. § 49-2913B. This is a statutory embodiment of the concepts dis-
cussed in Section IV A infra.
5. Approximately 35 states have concluded, either judicially or statu-
torily, that educational programs for the mentally handicapped are
necessary. MENTAL HEALTH LAW PROJECT, supra note 4, at 54. Cases
in point are in various stages of litigation throughout most of the state
court systems. See, e.g., Lebanks v. Spears, 60 F.R.D. 135 (E.D. La.
1973); Reid v. Board of Educ., 453 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1971); Harrison
v. Michigan, 350 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Mich. 1972); Case v. California,
Civil No. 101679 (Super. Ct. Riverside County, Cal., filed Jan. 7, 1972),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 4 Civil 13127 (Ct. of Appeals, 4th Dist., filed
July 16, 1974); California Ass'n for the Retarded v. California State
Bd. of Educ., Civil No. 237327 (Super. Ct., Sacramento County, Cal,
filed July 27, 1973); David P. v. State Dep't of Educ., Civil No. 658-
826 (Super. Ct. San Francisco County, Cal., filed Apr. 9, 1973); Uyeda
v. Department of Educ., Civil No. 102602 (Super. Ct. Riverside County
Cal, filed June 14, 1972); Burnstein v. Board of Educ., Civil No. R-
19266 (Super. Ct. Contra Costa County, Cal., filed Dec. 30, 1970); Col-
orado Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Colorado, Civil No. C-4620 (D.
Colo., filed Dec. 22, 1972); Florida Ass'n for Retarded Children v. State
Bd. of Educ., Civil No. 73-250-Civ. PF (S.D. Fla., filed Feb. 5, 1973);
640 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 55, NO. 4 (1976)
learned from the difficulties encountered in implementing the pre-
vious court decrees.
The major decisions in the area of education for the handicapped
break down into three groupings. The first asserts the exceptional
child's right to an education at public expense;" the second deals
with the right to treatment for the institutionalized retarded child;7
the last attacks improper evaluative testing procedures.8
The focus of the successful legal attack in the past has been on
alleged violations of the equal protection and due process safe-
guards incorporated in federal and state constitutions. While this
attack has opened the doors of the public schools to handicapped
children, issues central to the definition of what is an appropriate
education for them have yet to be resolved. Among these are estab-
lishing individualized testing procedures to assess children properly
and thereby enable workable goals to be set for them; developing
appropriate programs for these children; and providing public fund-
Kentucky Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Kentucky State Bd. of Educ.,
Civil No. 435 (E.D. Ky., filed Sept. 6, 1973); Marcombe v. Department
of Educ., Federal No. 73-102 (M.D. La., filed 1974); Maryland Ass'n for
Retarded Children v. Maryland, Equity No. 100-182-77676 (Cir. Ct.,
Baltimore City, Md., filed May 3, 1974); Barnett v. Goldman, Civil No.
71-3074 (S.D. Mass., filed July, 1974); Association for Mentally Ill
Children v. Greenblatt, Civil No. 71-3074-J (D.C. Mass., filed Dec. 30,
1971); Donnelly v. Minnesota, Civil No. 3-72-141 (D. Minn., filed May
2, 1973); Brandt v. Nevada, Civil No. P-2779 (D. Nev., filed Dec. 22,
1972); Hamilton v. Riddle, Civil No. 72-86 (W.D.N.C., filed May 5,
1972); North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. North Caro-
lina, Civil No. 3050 (E.D.N.C., filed May 19, 1972); North Dakota Ass'n
for Retarded Children v. Peterson, Civil No. 1196 (D.N.D., filed Nov.
28, 1972); Cuyahoga County Ass'n for Retarded Children & Adults v.
Essex, Civil No. C74-587 (N.D. Ohio, filed June 28, 1974); Halderman
v. Pittenger, Civil No. 74-2716 (E.D. Pa., filed Oct. 18, 1974); Rhode Is-
land Soc'y for Autistic Children v. Board of Regents for Educ., Civil
No. 5081 (D.R.I., Jan. 22, 1973); Tidewater Soc'y for Autistic Children
v. Virginia, Civil No. 426-72-N (E.D. Va., Dec. 26, 1972); Panitch v.
Wisconsin, Civil No. 72-C-461 (E.D. Wis., filed Aug. 14, 1972); Doe v.
Board of School Directors, Civil No. 377-770 (Cir. Ct. Milwaukee
County, Wis., filed Apr. 7, 1970).
6. See Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F.
Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), and 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Mills
v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
7. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), and 344 F.
Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, remanded in part, rev'd in
part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
8. See Diana v. State Bd. of Educ., Civil No. C-70 37 RFP (N.D. Cal., Jan.
7, 1970 and June 18, 1973); Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D.
Cal. 1972); Stewart v. Phillips, Civil No. 70-1199-F (D. Mass., filed
Sept. 14, 1970).
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ing for these programs. These issues will be discussed in the final
section of this comment. They are the challenge for the future.
Idealists will focus on the tremendous progress that has been
made by judicial acknowledgement that handicapped children have
a constitutional right to an education. Pragmatists will realize that,
as in other educational litigation, the struggle has just begun. The
case of Brown v. Board of Education 9 serves as a beacon and a
warning to advocates of the handicapped child's right to an educa-
tion. Just as black children cannot be denied equal educational op-
portunity, so too must this right be afforded to handicapped chil-
dren. Just as the mandate in Brown has met resistance and delay
in implementation, and twenty-two years later the courts are still
involved in bringing about effectuation of the Brown judicial con-
cept, so too will this pattern recur as handicapped children assert
their judicially acknowledged right to an education. The legal, so-
cial and educational theories discussed in this comment will figure
prominently in this anticipated struggle.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Justification for Exclusion
Early in our history, long before judicial acknowledgement of
the importance of public education in the American democratic
process, there was recognition that universal, publicly funded edu-
cation would have a role in forging the national character. Accord-
ingly, such a system was set up. Under our federalist scheme of
government, education was to be regulated by state legislatures,
with the only limitations on their authority to be those imposed by
the Federal Constitution. In order for the system of education
which evolved to function effectively and efficiently, it was thought
that individual differences had to be submerged to group goals. The
educator was revered and supreme in his position of authority, with
no one questioning the method of instruction nor the manner in
which it was carried out.
Down through the years as the value of education became in-
creasingly more apparent, each state began to adopt constitutional
provisions providing for the education of its citizenry, ° and to pro-
mulgate compulsory education statutes requiring children of certain
prescribed ages to attend public school." These same statutes
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. See, e.g., NEB. CONST. art. I, § 4, which provides: "[I]t shall be the
duty of the Legislature to pass suitable laws .. to encourage schools
and the means of instruction."
11. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 79-201, -202 (Reissue 1971), which provide
642 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 55, NO. 4 (1976)
which on their face conferred the benefits of education on all chil-
dren, however, also explicitly denied it to some. 12 When such stat-
utes were challenged, their validity was upheld, on the basis that
the educational system could not function if it had to account for
vast individual differences in children.
Watson v. City of Cambridge13 and Beattie v. Board of Education
of City of Antigo14 were representative of the early judicial philoso-
phy toward exceptional children. With total disregard for notions
of due process, the Watson court held that the local school district
could expel a student who displayed continued disorderly conduct
either voluntarily or by reason of imbecility. 15 The determinatin
as to what was disorderly conduct was to be made by school person-
nel. The Beattie decision dealt with a child who was academically
and physically capable of functioning within the school, but who
was also cerebral palsied and as a result drooled uncontrollably, was
slow in his speech and could not control his facial contortions. The
court held that he could be excluded from school because he had a
depressing and nauseating effect on the teachers and school chil-
dren, stating:
The right of a child of school age to attend the public schools of
this state cannot be insisted upon when its presence therein is
harmful to the best interests of the school. This, like other indi-
vidual rights, must be subordinated to the general welfare.'6
that children between the ages of seven and sixteen are subject to
compulsory attendance requirements, and that compulsory attendance
laws do not apply to children who are physically or mentally incapaci-
tated for the work done in school.
12. Id.
13. 157 Mass. 561, 32 N.E. 864 (1893).
14. 169 Wis. 231, 172 N.W. 153 (1919). In 1967, the Wisconsin Attorney
General reexamined Beattie and reaffirmed the power of local school
authorities to exclude a student. He qualified this, however, by add-
ing that "the [school district's] obligation to provide children with a
free public education does not cease upon exclusion and that other
means for their education must be provided." F. WEINTRAUB, A. ABE-
SON & D. BRADDOCK, STATE LAW & EDUCATION OF HANDICAPPED CHIL-
DREN: ISSUES & RECOMMENDATIONS 12 (1971).
15. The Massachusetts court said of this child: "[H]e is so weak in mind
as not to derive any marked benefit from instruction, and, further...
he is troublesome to other children .... He is also found unable to
take ordinary, decent, physical care of himself." 157 Mass. at 561, 32
N.E. at 864.
16. 169 Wis. at 233, 172 N.W. at 155 (emphasis added). The dissentingjudge pointed out that there was no evidence that the boy's presence
did not have a harmful effect. Id. at 236, 172 N.W. at 155.
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The implication was that the rights of individual children to attend
school were of lesser importance than the overall good of the sys-
tem. Therefore, handicapped children either could be placed in spe-
cial education classes, if they were available, or excluded entirely
from school, whichever was better for the system.1 7
In years past when the economy was essentially agrarian, when
society was less mobile and the family was a stable multi-genera-
tional unit with all members helping and caring for each other, the
devastating impact of excluding the handicapped child from school
was mitigated. Although he would be deprived of the opportunity
to develop his own potential, he could be assured that there would
be someone to care for him. This is not generally the situation to-
day. Fortunately, though, changes in the nature of our society have
also caused an evolution in our thinking about the individual in re-
lation to the system, providing an atmosphere where the rights of
the handicapped children to a publicly funded education may be ar-
gued successfully.
B. Socio-Legal Milieu
In the 1950s and 1960s, after the ordeal of two world wars and
the internal upheaval of the Communist "witch hunt" and after the
nation had experienced a period of economic prosperity, Americans
began to take stock of themselves as individuals and not just as
components of a system designed to effectuate a single purpose.
The results of this introspection were a growing awareness and ap-
preciation of the individual as an individual, and a concomitant as-
sertion of the individual's personal rights.
As part of this new awareness, the heretofore disadvantaged
classes (the black, the poor, the aged, the Native American, and the
woman) began to assert their rights. Where public pressure was
not successful, they resorted to the courts. The year 1954 marked
the real beginning of this continuing struggle to gain judicial, and
thereby public acceptance, of individual rights in a variety of socie-
tal contexts. Brown v. Board of Education, wherein the Court ac-
knowledged the important role education played in preparing the
individual for full participation in the democratic process, held that
"separate but equal" educational facilities were inherently unequal.
The Brown decision was a precursor of Pennsylvania Ass'n for
Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania ("P.A.R.C.") 18 and Mills v. Board
17. In 1919, the exceptional child was segregated for the general wel-
fare; today, his separation from the normal classroom is justified as
being for his own good. Involved in this philosophy is the issue of
whether it is more advantageous to students to teach them in homo-
geneous or heterogeneous groupings. See Section IV A infra.
18. '334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), and 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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of Education19 in which federal courts recognized the rights of an-
other segregated, silent and disadvantaged minority to equal educa-
tional opportunity. This minority group was composed of handi-
capped children.
20
The explanation as to why proponents of the handicapped child's
right to an equal educational opportunity were so long in asserting
their position 2 1 is rooted in the picture of American society that
herein has been painted. Such a stance could not have taken place
while the individual was sublimated in importance to the system.
Only when there was acceptance of the individual as an individual
and when a person's worth was not viewed as correlative with the
color of his skin could there begin to be acceptance of people whose
speech was slow or whose gait was halting. Because of this change
in stance, parents, who previously had grieved alone because of an
imperfect child and who had often hidden such a child away in the
back room of their homes, now began to talk about their tragedy
with other similarly situated parents. This helped them to change
19. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
20. Until the rights of individuals were brought into sharper
focus by the civil rights activists, little concern was expressed
within the educational establishment about the right of chil-
dren not to be labeled, the right of due process, and the right
of a child to challenge a system that purports to be operating
in his interest.
Cohen & DeYoung, The Role of Litigation in Improvement of Pro-
gramming for the Handicapped, in THE FIRST REVIEw OF SPECIAL EDU-
CATION VOL. 2, 262 (L. Mann & D. Sabatino eds. 1973).
Handicapped children are disadvantaged not only because of their
disability, but also because of their age. The assertion of their rights
closely parallels the assertion of normal children's rights. The handi-
capped child's claim to a hearing before exclusion from school applies
to the normal child as well. The right to an appropriate education,
geared to individual needs, and the concomitant right to valid testing
and evaluative procedures also apply to both groups.
Society's acknowledgement of the constitutional rights of children
evidences an erosion of the presumption that those in positions of au-
thority (e.g., parents, educators, the juvenile court system) act infal-
libly in the child's best interests. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1966).
21. According to one author, litigation increased because consumers had
gained strength; they were developing expertise and were becoming
more knowledgeable (parents recognized that their children were be-
ing neglected academically); and they were losing their timidity and
fear of retaliation. Roos, supra note 1, at 35. Roos discusses four
methods by which the goals of the handicapped could be reached. The
preferred method would be to try to cooperate with program adminis-
trators, and then with agency and state-level administrators responsi-
ble for the programs. Should this fail, the next avenue would be leg-
islation, with litigation as the least effective method.
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their attitudes toward their problem and gave them the strength in
numbers to advocate their position.22
As was previously alluded to,23 the educator and the school sys-
tem had always assumed awesome and venerable positions vis-a-vis
the lay person. For the parent of the exceptional child, the educa-
tor was especially revered and feared, as he was the only one who
could help the afflicted child. To question him or what he was do-
ing might incur his wrath and foreclose any possibility of helping
the child.2 4 However, the decades that brought increased assertion
of individuality were also a period of iconoclasm. Among the gods
who were challenged were the educators. With the realization that
these individuals were not infallible, parents began to question the
manner in which their children were or were not being educated.
Thus, there occurred a shift in responsibility for the retarded
child from the professional to the more militant parent and then ul-
timately to the attorney and the courtroom. During the years
which have been described, there grew a new breed of publicly in-
volved and committed attorneys who were eager to take up the
fight for individual liberty,25 aided by the public funding of legal
aid offices.
As all these undercurrents and crosscurrents met, the time was
propitious to seek judicial acknowledgement of the exceptional
child's right to an education.26
22. Comment, Educational Equality for the Mentally Retarded, 23 SYmA-
CUSE L. REV. 1141, 1162 (1972).
23. See Section II A supra.
24. Gilhool, Education: An Inalienable Right, 39 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN
597, 599 (1973). Professionals, however, should welcome litigation as
an opportunity to advance an agenda they share with parents. Id. at
600. Mr. Gilhool was the attorney for the plaintiffs in P.A.R.C.
It has been said, in regard to the inability of many well-intentioned
parents to deal effectively with public and private institutions, that
the parent of a child in a special education class within the
public school system is likely to hesitate to question the qual-
ity of the program since the threat of exclusion weighs heavily
in the parents' minds. The parent is realistically aware that
the cost of a private program is prohibitive and that the public
program is better than that which the parent could provide at
home. Similarly, a parent of a child who has been voluntarily
admitted to a state institution would hesitate to challenge the
quality of the care provided because the child is constantly
subject to the threat of subtle-and not so subtle-retaliation.
Murdock, Civil Rights of the Mentally Retarded: Some Critical Issues,
48 NoTRE DAME LAWYER 133, 143 (1972).
25. Gilhool, supra note 24, at 600.
26. Gilhool set out the four goals he saw the exceptional child achieving
through litigation: the securing of the right to an education; the crea-
tion of a new forum to enforce rights or create new ones; the focusing
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III. LITIGATIONAL ACHIEVEMENTS
A. The Right to an Education
P.A.R.C.27 and MiJIs28 have established that the exceptional child
has a federal constitutional right to a publicly funded education. 29
Even though neither decision is of appellate level, each has had dra-
matic impact in other states. Federal and state courts confronted
by similar litigation have resolved the issue in comparable manner,
and legislatures, eager to avoid such litigation in their states, have
adopted statutes which incorporate the provisions and suggestions
of the court decrees.
P.A.R.C. was the seminal case in this area. The plaintiffs in-
cluded not only mentally retarded children who had been excluded
from Pennsylvania's public schools, but also a state-wide parents'
organization.3 0  In this suit, the plaintiffs alleged that the state's
compulsory education statute violated the equal protection and due
process safeguards embodied in the fourteenth amendment. Al-
though the law in question said that the state would provide a
proper education for all its exceptional children, it permitted the
exclusion of children who were uneducable or untrainable, and,
therefore, could not benefit from a public education. 3 1
of public attention on certain facts not previously known; and the
helping of each citizen to redefine his notion of himself. Id. at 601-
08. The latter two goals are of critical importance to the disadvan-
taged. Improvement in the handicapped child's self-identity, and an
increase in the public's awareness of his problem, would seem to be
essential to a meaningful improvement in the handicapped child's le-
gal rights.
27. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), and 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa.
1972).
28. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
29. An earlier decision, Wolf v. State Legislature, Civil No. 182646 (3d
Jud. Dist., Utah, 1968) involved the exclusion from school of two train-
able, mentally retarded children. Basing its decision on state law, the
court concluded that education is a fundamental right.
30. The plaintiffs brought the case as a class action, a common procedure
in this area of litigation.
The existence of the Association and its involvement as a motivat-
ing force in the litigation bear out the theories expressed in the preced-
ing section. The Association was not only important in instigating the
action, but also in ensuring implementation of the court's orders. Its
post-litigational role involved contacting parents of retarded children
and apprising them of the decision and its ramifications for each child;
mounting a state-wide publicity campaign to educate the public about
handicapped children and their potential as valuable citizens; and
serving as a watchdog to ensure that all levels of the state educational
bureaucracy were complying with the dictates of the court.
31. The statutes challenged were:
1. 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 13-1375 (1962), which relieved the state
RIGHTS OF HANDICAPPED
The equal protection argument centered on the fact that Penn-
sylvania was already providing a public education to most of the
children in the state. Denial of such a state-conferred benefit to
handicapped children was shown to have no rational basis in fact,
because they were capable of being educated, albeit with a some-
what different expectation level than that of normals.32 This was
established by a massive amount of incontrovertible expert testi-
mony showing that the handicapped child can learn and benefit
from a publicly funded education,33 and that formalized education
is even more critical to his learning progress than to that of a nor-
mal child.
34
board of education of any obligation to educate a child whom the pub-
lic school psychologist certified as uneducable and untrainable. Upon
such certification, the burden of caring for the child shifted to the state
department of welfare, which was under no obligation to provide edu-
cational services;
2. 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 13-1304 (1962), which allowed an indefinite
postponement of admission to public schools of any child who had not
attained a mental age of five;
3. 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 13-1330 (1962), which excused from com-
pulsory school attendance any child whom a psychologist found un-
able to profit therefrom;
4. 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 13-1326 (1962), which defined the com-
pulsory school age as eight to seventeen, and which had been used to
postpone the admission of the retardate until age eight, or to eliminate
him at age seventeen.
32. The court acknowledged the different achievement levels of children:
It is the Commonwealth's obligation to place each mentally
retarded child in a free, public program of education and
training appropriate to the child's capacity, within the context
of a presumption that, among the alternative programs of edu-
cation and training required by statute to be available, place-
ment in a regular public school class is preferable to place-
ment in a special public school class and placement in a spe-
cial public school class is preferable to placement in any other
type of program of education and training.
334 F. Supp. at 1260.
33. The consent agreement incorporated a summary of expert opinion
which concluded that
all mentally retarded persons are capable of benefitting from
a program of education and training; that the greatest number
of retarded persons, given such education and training, are ca-
pable of achieving self-sufficiency and the remaining few,
With such education and training are capable of achieving
some degree of self-care; that the earlier such education and
training begins, the more thoroughly and the more efficiently
a mentally retarded person will benefit from it and, whether
begun early or not, that a mentally retarded person can bene-
fit at any point in his life and development from a program
of education.
334 F. Supp. at 1259.
34. Gilhool, supra note 24, at 602. Education is essential for the exception-
al child, because without it he has a higher probability of being insti-
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The defendants could not and did not try to counter these argu-
ments. The court acknowledged that there was a constitutionally
colorable claim,' ". but did not actually get to the equal protection is-
sue, because the case was resolved with a consent decree agreed to
by the parties and approved by the court"
In regard to the due process argument advanced by the plain-
tiffs, the focus was on the right of parents and children to speak out
on the appropriateness of educational assignments before they were
made. Labelling a child as handicapped and in need of special edu-
cation was analogized to stigmatization, with the school acting as
a labeller.3 7 There were two reasons advanced for this conceptu-
alization. The first was the deprecation with which the general
community looks on the handicapped person. It would have been
doubly tragic for an individual to endure the scorn and disdain
heaped on the handicapped if he were not really mentally debili-
tated but had been incorrectly labelled as such. The second reason
tutionalized than a handicapped child who has received a public edu-
cation. Moreover, he also faces the possibility of early death. The fig-
ures show that there is a high death rate at institutions among children
who have not been educated in self-help skills. For example, the dan-
gers of scalding water may be foreign to such children. Id. at 603.
35. 343 F. Supp. at 296. It was necessary for the court to find such a claim
in order for it to assume jurisdiction and enter a consent decree.
Plaintiffs do not challenge the separation of special classes for
retarded children from regular classes or the proper assign-
ment of retarded children to special classes. Rather plaintiffs
question whether the state, having undertaken to provide pub-
lic education to some children, . . . may deny it to plaintiffs
entirely. We are satisfied that the evidence raises serious
doubts (and hence a colorable claim) as to the existence of a
rational basis for such exclusions.
Id. at 297.
Though the plaintiffs in P.A.R.C. did not challenge the segregation
of handicapped children from normals, separate special education
classes, like the pre-1954 schools maintained for black children, are, ar-
guably, inherently unequal. See Section IV A infra.
36. A consent agreement that binds members of a class must be judicially
approved. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (e). Many subsequent similar cases have
also terminated in consent decrees.
37. Experts agree that it is primarily the school which imposes
the mentally retarded label and concomitant stigmatization
upon children, either initially or later on through a change in
educational assignment. This follows from the fact that the
school constitutes the first social institution with which the
child ... comes into contact ....
... "The stigma of bearing the label 'retarded' is bad
enough, but to bear the label when the placement is question-
able or outright erroneous is an intolerable situation."
343 F. Supp. at 295 (footnotes omitted), quoting from Garrison &
Hammill, Who Are the Retarded, EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN, Oct. 9, 1971,
at 20.
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was that the very nature of the programs led to a stigmatization.
While the regular public school system was built on a scheme of
progressive educational achievement, special education classes were
not, and thereby prevented crossover. Therefore, if a child had
been incorrectly labelled, there would have been little opportunity
to rectify the error.
As was the case with the equal protection argument, the P.A.R.C.
court3 8 did not rule on the due process issue because of the consent
decree.30  However, the court did find a colorable constitutional
claim, relying on Wisconsin v. Constantineau,4 0 which had success-
fully challenged the validity of a statute permitting the local sheriff
to post the names of known drunkards at places where alcoholic
beverages were sold in order to prevent further sales to these in-
dividuals. The posting was done without notice to the parties and
without affording them the opportunity for a hearing. The Con-
stantineau Court considered this labelling process to be a stigmati-
zation, and as such it required procedural due process protections.4 '
In Constantineau, the individual was deprived of access to liquor.
This was comparable to the pre-P.A.R.C. labelling of children as
retarded, depriving them of needed special education. Therefore,
the P.A.R.C. court held that these children, just as Mrs. Constan-
tineau, required the protection afforded by a hearing which com-
ported with due process standards so as to ensure that the label
being affixed was as accurate as possible.
38. Id.
39. The consent decree was signed in June, 1971. Several authors, noting
that the agreement on the due process issue was signed before that
dealing with the equal protection claim, dated October, 1971, have con-
cluded that the due process issue will be of more precedential im-
portance. See Weintraub & Abeson, Appropriate Education for all
Handicapped Children: A Growing Issue, 23 SYmAcusE L. REv. 1037,
1056 (1972); Comment, Right to Education for Mentally Retarded
Children, 43 U.M.K.C.L. REv. 79, 94 (1974). But there is another pos-
sible explanation for the order in which the agreements were signed.
Had there not been concurrence on the due process issue, the court
could have abstained from ruling on the equal protection argument,
either for the purpose of allowing the state courts to interpret the
arguably ambiguous statute or on the basis that a clause in the state
constitution could be interpreted to afford the plaintiffs the relief
they sought.
40. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
41. The only issue present here is whether the label or characteri-
zation given a person by "posting," though a mark of serious
illness to some, is to others such a stigma or badge of disgrace
that procedural due process requires notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard. We agree with the district court that the
private interest is such that those requirements ... must be
met.
Id. at 436.
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Despite the ostensible unanimity of feeling between the parties,
as evidenced by the consent decrees, the P.A.R.C. court took a fur-
ther step, appointing two masters, a special educator,42 and an attor-
ney,43 to ensure the defendant's compliance with the agreement.
Such action, rather than expressing unwarranted judicial cynicism,
was an acknowledgement that the wrongs of many years could not
be righted overnight. Reference already has been made to the fact
that educators had come to revere their positions, making the order-
liness and structure in their world into its own self-generating re-
ward. To admit the previously excluded handicapped child into the
public schools in large numbers and with alacrity required rapid re-
shuffling of facilities44 and an equally dramatic revamping of the
educator's thinking. The court was obviously concerned that the
progress in effectuating the consent decree would be nonexistent
without some form of court supervision.
Mills stands in contrast to P.A.R.C. in several ways. First, from
the point of view of the legal theorist it is the more significant case
because it established by court decision what had merely been
agreed to by the parties in P.A.R.C., namely that to exclude the ex-
ceptional child from publicly funded education, while affording
such a benefit to all other children, is a denial of due process. 45 Sec-
ondly, whereas in P.A.R.C. the plaintiffs included only handicapped
children, in Mills the category was broadened to encompass all chil-
dren excluded from school because of mental, behavioral, emotional,
or physical handicaps. 46 The result of the Mills widening was that
42. Herbert Goldstein, Chairman of the Special Education Department at
Yeshiva University.
43. Dennis Haggerty, a Philadelphia lawyer, consultant to the President's
Committee on Mental Retardation, and Co-Chairman of the ABA Sub-
committee on Law and the Mentally Retarded.
44. In P.A.R.C., the defendants were given 90 days to identify all mentally
retarded children; instruction was to begin no later than September,
1972.
45. 348 F. Supp. at 875.
46. The plaintiffs in the class action suit were the parents and guardians
of District of Columbia children who had been excluded under the fol-
lowing statutes:
1. D.C. CODE ANN. § 31-201 (1973), which required every person re-
siding in the District of Columbia who had custody of a child between
the ages of seven and sixteen to cause such a child to be instructed in
public, private, or parochial school, or to be instructed privately;
2. D.C. CODE ANN. § 31-203 (1973), which excused a child from at-
tending school only when, upon examination, the child was found to
be unable mentally or physically to profit from attendance; provided,
however, that if such examination were to show that such child could
benefit from specialized instruction adapted to his needs, he would be
required to attend such instruction; and
3. D.C. CODE ANN. § 31-207 (1973), which made it a criminal of-
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thereafter in the District of Columbia no child could be denied his
right to be educated at public expense without being assured of cer-
tain due process procedural safeguards. 47 The Mills court also dealt
directly with a problem area that P.A.R.C. did not have to consider.
Admitting the previously excluded children into the public school
system, properly evaluating or reevaluating them, hiring competent
personnel and finding appropriate facilities to handle this influx re-
quired a tremendous expenditure of public funds. The Pennsyl-
vania defendants did not put forth insufficient funding as a defense,
but the Mills defendants did, along with an allegation that because
of such funding problems, the system would be unable to furnish
services to both normal and exceptional children. The court found
this argument less than persuasive,48 and held that because funds
fense for a parent to fail to comply with § 31-201.
After referring to the statutes, the court said:
The Court need not belabor the fact that requiring parents to
see that their children attend school under pain of criminal
penalties presupposes that an educational opportunity will be
made available to the children. The Board of Education is re-
quired to make such opportunity available....
Thus the Board of Education has an obligation to provide
whatever specialized instruction that will benefit the child.
By failing to provide plaintiffs and their class the publicly
supported specialized education to which they are entitled, the
Board of Education violates the above statutes and its own
regulations.
348 F. Supp. at 874.
47. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308 (1975). In Goss and Wood, the Supreme Court took additional
steps to protect children threatened with imminent exclusion from
public school, and to punish school administrators and personnel who
exceeded their authority and violated the civil rights of students in ex-
clusion procedures against them.
48. The defendants are required . . . to provide a publicly-sup-
ported education for these "exceptional" children. Their fail-
ure to fulfill this clear duty to include and retain these chil-
dren in the public school system, or otherwise provide them
with publicly-supported education, ... . cannot be excused by
the claim that there are insufficient funds. In Goldberg v.
Kelly ... the Supreme Court ... held that Constitutional
rights must be afforded citizens despite the greater expense
involved .... Similarly the District of Columbia's interest in
educating the excluded children clearly must outweigh its in-
terest in preserving its financial resources. If sufficient funds
are not available to finance all of the services and programs
that are needed and desirable in the system then the availablefunds must be expended equitably in such a manner that no
child is entirely excluded from a publicly-supported education
consistent with his needs and abilities to benefit therefro..
The inadequacies of the District of Columbia Public School
System, whether occasioned by insufficient funding or admin-
istrative inefficiency, certainly cannot be permitted to bear
more heavily on the "exceptional" or handicapped child than
on the normal child.
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were available to educate normal children, they had to be spent
equitably, so as not to exclude any child from an education. 49
Despite its legal significance, the Mills situation presented imple-
mentation problems. Unlike P.A.R.C., in which a state-wide organi-
zation of parents acted as the moving force for the litigation and as
the overseer of subsequent compliance, in Mills the prime movers
for the action were Legal Aid attorneys in Washington, D.C. After
the litigational success in Mills, there was no strong parental force
to ensure compliance with the court's judgment. To compound the
problem further, the Mills court, unlike the one in P.A.R.C., did not
order the appointment of court masters. However, it did indicate
that it would take such action if the district delayed in implement-
ing the decree. 50 Arguably, the court followed this procedure be-
348 F. Supp. at 876 (emphasis added).
One author has argued that in rejecting the defense of insufficient
funds, the Mills court seemed to consider education to be a fundamen-
tal right-that had no fundamental right or suspect class been in-
volved, an insufficiency of funds would have been a valid defense. He
suggests that the Mills court might reach a different conclusion today
in view of San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
See Comment, supra note 39, at 85-86. But see notes 51-62 infra and
accompanying text.
A court decree may be ineffective if funds for the program it or-
ders are not appropriated. In Maryland Ass'n for Retarded Children
v. Maryland, Equity No. 77676 (Baltimore County Cir. Ct. 1974), a case
tried in state court on issues of state law (unlike Mills and P.A.R.C.),
a Maryland court held that each child was entitled to a free public ed-
ucation to be provided either inside the public school system or in a
nonpublic facility. Implementation of the P.A.R.C. decree, however,
was entirely dependent upon funding of the special education program
by the Maryland Legislature in 1975. Comment, A Procedural Guide-
line for Implementing the Right to Free Public Education for Handi-
capped Children, 4 BALTIMORE L. REv. 136, 141 (1974).
49. The school board persuaded the Mills court not to appoint a master,
by submitting to the court a plan to identify exceptional children and
to provide for their publicly supported education. The court said:
Despite the defendants' failure to abide by the provisions of
the Court's previous orders in this case and despite the de-
fendants' continuing failure to provide an education for these
children, the Court is reluctant to arrogate to itself the respon-
sibility of administering this or any other aspect of the Public
School System of the District of Columbia through the vehicle
of a special master. Nevertheless, inaction or delay on the
part of the defendants, or failure by the defendants to imple-
ment the judgment and decree herein within the time speci-
fied therein will result in the immediate appointment of a spe-
cial master to oversee and direct such implementation under
direction of this Court.
348 F. Supp. at 877.
50. For an extensive examination of the problems in implementing the
P.A.R.C. decree and the Mills decision see Kirp, Kuriloff & Buss, Legal
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cause the school system involved was confined to a small area,
whereas the Pennsylvania system spanned an entire state. Whether
court masters would have made a difference in effectuating Mills is
problematic. It is sufficient to note that promulgating the new
educational mandates and ensuring compliance with them was not
accomplished with any great degree of finesse.
Despite the seeming resolution of the issue of the handicapped
child's right to a publicly funded education, the recent Supreme
Court case, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,5 '
has injected some uncertainty into the area.5 2 There has been com-
Mandates and Organizational Change, in IssuEs IN THE CLAssmcATIoN
OF CHILDREN VOL. II (N. Hobbs ed. 1975); Kirp, Buss & Kuriloff, Legal
Reform of Special Education, Empirical Studies and Procedural Pro-
posals, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 40 (1974). Based on their study, the authors
arrived at the following conclusions: Legal mandates are not self-ful-
filling, but must rely on others for implementation; the mandates most
readily implemented are those requiring a minimal amount of organi-
zational change; resistance to such mandates comes not so much from
resentfulness and malevolence as from a perceived threat to current
institutional and social structure and to people functioning comfort-
ably within the structure.
They further concluded that the following elements are necessary
to achieve the goals of legal change and full implementation: Intense
and lasting pressure on the appropriate agencies and departments to-
gether with systematic incentives for them to comply; court-appointed
overseers to help direct and encourage implementation through to
completion; provision of the resources called for by the mandate, i.e.,
money and personnel; strong commitment by institutional administra-
tors-a commitment made generally only when administrators are as-
sured that the needs of their institutions have not been overlooked or
underestimated, but have been taken into consideration in the creation
of the orders they must implement.
51. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). For an extensive analysis of the holding in Rodri-
guez see Comment, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodri-
guez: A Study of Alternatives Open to State Courts, 8 U. SAN FRAN-
cisCo L. REv. 90 (1973).
In Rodriguez, the residents of the Edgewood district of San Antonio
challenged the constitutionality of Texas's public school financing sys-
tem, which, relying heavily on local property taxation, resulted in un-
equal per-pupil expenditures. Under this scheme, the Edgewood dis-
trict, taxing itself at a rate of $1.05 per $100 of assessed valuation,
could raise only $356 per pupil, whereas Alamo Heights, a more afflu-
ent section of the city, could tax itself at $.85 per $100 of valuation,
and raise $594. 411 U.S: at 12-13.
52. The defendants in a recent right to education case, Colorado Ass'n for
Retarded Children v. Colorado, Civil No. C-4620 (D. Colo., filed Dec.
22, 1972), moved to dismiss on the grounds that Rodriguez held that
there is no right to education protected by the Constitution. The court
denied the motion, distinguishing Rodriguez as follows:
1. The discrimination in Rodriguez was only relative, since all
those children received some program of education; in this case, how-
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mentary 53 speculating on the impact Rodriguez will have on future
litigation in which exceptional children assert that their exclusion
from a public school system is a denial of equal protection.
5 4
The consternation generated by Rodriguez centers around the
Court's holding that education, though important to the individual's
ability to function effectively in a democratic society, does not rise
to the level of a fundamental interest, and, therefore, will not trig-
ger the strict scrutiny test. Such concern seems groundless because
P.A.R.C. and Mills, while not containing an extensive equal protec-
tion analysis, appear to have relied on the rational basis test.55 In
these cases, the two possible justifications for denying the excep-
tional child a public education were the factual assertion that they
were uneducable (P.A.R.C.) and the legal defense that there were
insufficient funds to support such an expansive program of educa-
tion (Mills). Both were rejected by their respective courts and
there is nothing to indicate that other courts would not reach simi-
lar conclusions. In addition, because the basis for the substantive
claim to education usually lies in a state law right, as well as the
equal protection clause, and because the procedural claim relies on
the due process clause, plaintiffs do not have to be concerned with
ever, the plaintiffs experienced a total deprivation under the defend-
ant's policies;
2. The handicapped possess special characteristics that warrant
strict inspection of the exclusionary practices that were not present in
Rodriguez;
3. Recent data demonstrate that all children can benefit from edu-
cational programs, and, therefore, defendants can show no rational re-
lationship between their state constitutional purpose to educate all
children and their policy of excluding the handicapped.
53. See Diamond & Reed, Rodriguez and Retarded Children, 2 J.L. &
EDUc. 476 (1973); Casey, The Supreme Court and the Suspect Class,
40 EXcEmONAL CHILDREN 119 (1973).
54. Some originally feared that Rodriguez evidenced a conservative
Court's intention to cease judicial intervention in public schooling.
Such has not proved to be the case. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1975); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). Based on Justice
Powell's dictum in Rodriguez, however, there is reason to believe that
the Court will not allow itself to become embroiled in more complex
educational problems:
[D]ifficult questions of educational policy ... [lie in an]
area in which this court's lack of specialized knowledge and
experience counsels against premature interference with the
informed judgments made at the state and local levels.
411 U.S. at 42. Often, state conduct is so grossly improper that defer-
ral to educational expertise is unnecessary.
55. Under the rational basis test, the plaintiff has the burden of showing
that the classification created by the state is totally arbitrary. See
generally Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
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which federal equal protection test a court will apply. The issue in-
stead can be resolved on a state-by-state basis relying on the equal
protection clause found in most state constitutions.5 6
Concern over Rodriguez's effect on future litigation in the mold
of P.A.R.C. and Mills is further minimized because close inspection
shows that the Rodriguez Court's reasoning is inapplicable to the
problem presented by retarded children excluded from the public
school system. The facts in Rodriguez show that a basic education
was furnished to all children. The controversy centered around the
fact that the per pupil amount of money spent for this education
varied from school district to school district because the Texas
method of school financing was based on the local property tax.57
56. The issue in Rodriguez, school financing, could be decided on state
grounds with a different result. Prior to Rodriguez, in Serrano v.
Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971), the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court had ruled that California's system of school fi-
nancing, similar to Texas's, was unconstitutional. Arguably, Rodri-
guez did not overrule Serrano, since the allegations in Serrano were
based on both state and federal constitutional rights. Thus, the court
said, "[O]ur analysis of plaintiffs' federal equal protection contention
is also applicable to their claim under these state constitutional provi-
sions." Id. at 596 n.ll, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609 n.11, 487 P.2d at 1249 n.11.
The state constitutional provision that the California Supreme Court
relied on in Serrano was the privileges and immunities section, which
had in previous cases been determined to be the equivalent of the fed-
eral equal protection clause.
Subsequent cases, most notably Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303
A.2d 273 (1973), and Milliken v. Green, 389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457
(1973), have held such financing systems to be unconstitutional under
state constitutional provisions. In Robinson, the court, found in a con-
stitutional provision for a "thorough and efficient" system of free pub-
lic schools, a requirement that all children receive a qualitatively com-
parable education. 62 N.J. at 496, 303 A.2d at 285. Furthermore, the
court approved dollar input as the criterion for measuring constitu-
tional compliance. Whereas the Rodriguez court wanted the plaintiffs
to make an affirmative showing of the direct correlation between fi-
nancial input and educational results, Robinson put the burden on the
defendants to show another "viable criterion for measuring compliance
with the constitutional mandate." Id. at 515-16, 303 A.2d at 295. Bar-
ring such a showing, the dollar input scale would be retained, and the
state's responsibility to provide education for all its citizens would re-
quire equal appropriation of funds. Such a scheme can work against
the handicapped child who requires a greater appropriation for his ed-
ucation.
57. The plaintiffs failed to show any correlation between the amount of
money spent and the quality of the education received. The Rodriguez
Court noted:
On even the most basic questions in this area, the scholars and
educational experts are divided. Indeed, one of the hottest
sources of controversy concerns the extent to which there is
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Because a fundamental interest was not involved, the Court used
the rational basis test and found that such a financing scheme was
rationally related to a legitimate state interest in local control and
involvement in the public education process.58  The situation con-
fronting handicapped children is different because education is be-
ing totally denied to a certain class of children. Such total denial
is not founded on any rational basis once it has been shown that
such a child can benefit from an education. "9
In Rodriguez, the plaintiffs tried to invoke the strict scrutiny
test by arguing that wealth was a suspect class. The Court rejected
this allegation because the plaintiffs had not proven that a definable
class based on wealth, or lack thereof, existed.60 Furthermore, even
assuming the existence of such a class, there was no equal protec-
tion violation unless the class was totally excluded from the impor-
tant benefit in question. In this case, the poor did not suffer total
exclusion but were treated with less than exact equality. 1
a demonstrable correlation between educational expenditures
and the quality of education ....
411 U.S. at 42-43 (footnote omitted).
58. The Court also considered the pervasiveness of the method it was be-
ing asked to overturn. With the exception of Hawaii, which had only
one state-wide district, and, therefore, no interdistrict inequities, every
state used the Texas system. The Court was reluctant to discard such
a pervasive system in favor of an untried method that might also
prove to be discriminatory. Further influencing the Court was the tra-
dition of deferring to state legislatures on matters of local taxation.
59. If the schooling provided is completely inappropriate to the child's
needs, it may be argued that an education has been denied him.
60. However described, it is clear that appellee's suit asks this
Court to extend its most exacting scrutiny to review a system
that allegedly discriminates against a large, diverse, and amor-
phous class, unified only by the common factor of residence
in districts that happen to have less taxable wealth than other
districts. The system of alleged discrimination and the class
it defines have none of the traditional indicia of suspectness:
the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to
such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated
to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political proc-
ess.
411 U.S. at 28 (footnote omitted).
With handicapped children who are totally excluded from school,
wealth may define a suspect class, since it may determine whether or
not the child will receive any education at all. Wealthy parents will
be able to afford private schools, while handicapped children of poor
families will be denied schooling.
61. The Court referred to Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), and Doug-
las v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), wherein the poor, unable to af-
ford a transcript or a lawyer, were totally denied a criminal appeal.
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The retarded, unlike the poor in Rodriguez, do constitute a clear-
ly definable class, one which has been saddled with disabilities, sub-
jected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment and relegated to
a position of political powerlessness which calls for protection. For
this reason, if it were necessary, the strict scrutiny test could be in-
voked. It could also be called upon because, with the exceptional
child, the issue is not the quality or adequacy of the education but
the total lack of it. The denial of education could determine
whether education rises to the level of a fundamental interest.62
Access to education may be a fundamental right but the Rodriguez
Court did not have to decide this because it was not faced with the
situation in which there was total deprivation of an education.
The Court indicated that it had never been concerned with the relative
qualities of appointed and retained counsel; all that was constitution-
ally required was that the poor be given the minimum benefit neces-
sary.
This emphasis on "minimal" may indicate that even if the plaintiffs
had shown a correlation between funding and educational quality, the
Court would not have invalidated the financing system. Language in
the opinion, however, seems to imply the contrary:
Neither appellees nor the District Court addressed the fact
that, unlike each of the foregoing cases, lack of personal re-
sources has not occasioned an absolute deprivation of the de-
sired benefit. The argument here is not that children in dis-
tricts having relatively low assessable values are receiving no
public education; rather, it is that they are receiving a poorer
quality education than that available to children in districts
having more assessable wealth. ... [A] sufficient answer to
appellees' argument is that, at least when wealth is involved,
the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality
or precisely equal advantages.... The State repeatedly as-
serted in its briefs . . .that ... it now assures "every child
in every school district an adequate education." No proof was
offered at trial persuasively discrediting or refuting the State's
assertion.
411 U.S. at 23-24 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
62. Even if it were conceded that some identifiable quantum of
education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to a
meaningful exercise of either right [the rights to vote and to
enjoy first amendment freedoms], we have no indication that
the present levels of educational expenditure in Texas provide
an education that falls short. Whatever merit appellees' argu-
ment might have if a State financing system occasioned an ab-
solute denial of educational opportunities to any of its chil-
dren, that argument provides no basis for finding an interfer-
ence with fundamental rights where only relative differences
in spending levels are involved and where-as is true in the
present case-no charge fairly could be made that the system
fails to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the
basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights
of speech and of full participation in the political process.
411 U.S. at 36-37.
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B. The Right to Treatment
P.A.R.C., Mills and the state cases 63 currently being litigated
have established and are affirming that the exceptional child has a
right to be educated at public expense. The educational process
usually takes place in the public schools; however, they are not and
need not be the exclusive locus for educating. Some states have
legislative schemes which permit use of public funds to educate the
handicapped in private schools, offering programs suited to the
child's needs when such programs are not offered in public school
settings."4 But, there is still a large number of children, the institu-
tionalized handicapped children, who are receiving no form of pub-
licly funded education. They have been placed in state facilities be-
cause of the profoundness of their handicap or the degree of care
they require, or because in the pre-P.A.R.C.-Mills situation there
was often no other place where such children could get even a sem-
blance of training. Conditions in the institutions for the retarded
have been deplorable and the training the children have received
has been minimal. Therefore, such facilities cannot be conceptual-
ized as an alternative educational setting. 5  Placement in such a lo-
cation was custodial and comparable to incarceration, often of life-
long duration.
Wyatt v. Stickney"" was the initial case to establish that an in-
63. See cases cited note 5 supra.
64. See note 149 and accompanying text infra.
65. If community-based educational facilities existed, resort to state insti-
tutions would not be necessary. Such state facilities can be viewed as
society's warehouses for its defective products. Usually located in
rural areas, they often leave inmates far away from educational facili-
ties.
The Wyatt court has been criticized for its failure to consider com-
munity resources as an alternative to residential care. Burt, Judicial
Action to Aid the Retarded, in IssUss IN THE CLASSIFICATION OF CHM-
DREN VOL. II, 312 (N. Hobbs ed. 1975).
66. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), and 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala.
1972), af'd in part, remanded in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
In addition to being the first right to treatment case in the area of
mental retardation, Wyatt is unique in that the court awarded the
plaintiffs $36,754 in attorneys' fees under the private attorney general
concept. In so doing, the court said,
Veritably, it is no overstatement to assert that all of Ala-
bama's citizens have profited and will continue to profit from
this litigation. So prevalent are mental disorders in our soci-
ety that no family is immune from their perilous incursion.
Consequently, the availability of institutions capable of deal-
ing successfully with such disorders is essential, and, of
course, in the best interests of all Alabamians.
344 F. Supp. at 409. The prospect of further fee awards has, however,
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voluntarily committed 67 mentally retarded individual is constitu-
tionally entitled to adequate habilitation. Although it was a class
action dealing with handicapped children in a state facility, its the-
oretical basis was grounded in a right to treatment case that arose
in a criminal setting and dealt with a single individual. In Rouse
v. Cameron,8 the plaintiff had been charged with carrying a dan-
gerous weapon, a misdemeanor punishable by a one year maximum
sentence. He was found not guilty because of insanity and was
committed to a mental hospital. At the time the habeas corpus peti-
tion was filed, he had been institutionalized for more than four
years. The court said that:
The principal issues raised by this appeal are whether a person
involuntarily committed to a mental hospital on being acquitted of
an offense by reason of insanity has a right to treatment that is cog-
nizable in habeas corpus and if so, how violation of the right may
be established.
The purpose of involuntary hospitalization is treatment, not
punishment.... Absent treatment, the hospital is "tranform[ed]
... into a penitentiary where one could be held indefinitely for no
convicted offense, and this even though the offense of which he was
previously acquitted because of doubt as to his sanity might not
have been one of the more serious felonies" or might have been, as
it was here, a misdemeanor.69
been foreclosed by the recent Supreme Court decision in Alyeska Pipe-
line Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
67. The children at Partlow had been involuntarily committed under Ala-
bama law. 344 F. Supp. at 390 n.5. It may be argued that, in the
usual situation, retarded children are not involuntarily committed, and
that institutionalization is chosen in order to ensure proper care of the
child. Realistically, however, the choice is often an involuntary one,
made often when there is no other way for the parents to provide the
child with any meaningful care.
Inherent in the concept of voluntary action is a free choice be-
tween alternatives-at least the opportunity to consider alter-
nate courses of action. If there is only one place to go-if real
treatment and placement alternatives do not exist for the
mentally handicapped-then we are only pretending that
there can be "voluntary" patients.
Bazelon, The Judicial Process-A Tool for Reform, in THE IGHTS OF
THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED, supra note 1, at 11.
But see Burt, supra note 65, in which the author gives little
credence to this position, criticizes the Wyatt decision, and questions
Wyatt's precedential value. Burt notes that the right to treatment for
adults has been recognized in cases of active detention by the state.
See Rouse v. Cameron, 372 F.2d 451 (1966). The institutionalization
of the child, however, is not analogous where he has not actually been
involuntarily committed, as was the case in Wyatt.
68. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
69. Id. at 452-53 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted), quoting from
Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (Fahy, J.,
concurring).
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Because the rationale for confinement in a hospital was the need for
treatment, failure to provide it raised the constitutional issues of
due process, equal protection, and cruel and unusual punishment.
However, the court did not deal with these but instead based its
holding on existing statutory law.7 0
In Wyatt, however, deprivation of treatment rose to the level of
a constitutional violation, 71 because without habilitation there was
no constitutional justification for committing such a person. Habil-
itation, as defined by this court, was:
[T]he process by which the staff of the institution assists the resi-
dent to acquire and maintain those life skills which enable him to
cope more effectively with the demands of his own person and of
his environment and to raise the level of his physical, mental, and
social efficiency. Habilitation includes but is not limited to pro-
grams of formal, structured education and treatment.72
70. "A person hospitalized in a public hospital for mental illness shall,
during his hospitalization, be entitled to medical and psychiatric care
and treatment." D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-562 (1967).
The District of Columbia's statutory right to treatment may be
summarized as follows:
1. The hospital need not show that the treatment will cure or im-
prove him but only that there is a bona fide effort to do so. 2. The
effort must be to provide treatment which is adequate in light of pres-
ent knowledge, although the possibility of better treatment does not
necessarily prove that the one provided is unsuitable or inadequate. 3.
Initial and periodic inquiries must be made into the needs and condi-
tions of the patient with a view to providing suitable treatment for
him, and to insuring that the program provided is suited to his particu-
lar needs.
When, in the statutory summary, "school" is substituted for "hospi-
tal," "education" for "treatment," and "student" for "patient," a com-
prehensive definition of the right to an effective education is formu-
lated.
71. [A]bsent treatment, the hospital is transformed "into a peni-
tentiary where one could be held indefinitely for no convicted
offense." . . . The purpose of involuntary hospitalization for
treatment purposes is treatment and not mere custodial care
or punishment. This is the only justification, from a constitu-
tional standpoint, that allows civil commitments to mental in-
stitutions. ...
T o deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the
altruistic theory that confinement is for human therapeutic
reasons and then fail to provide adequate treatment violates
the very fundamentals of due process.
325 F. Supp. at 784-85 quoting from Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d
943, 950 (1960) (Fahy, J., concurring).
72. 344 F. Supp. at 395. By so defining "habilitation" the court facilitated
the argument that the state must afford to handicapped children op-
portunities for cognitive as well as social growth, because it offers
these opportunities (called "education") to other children. See Burt,
supra note 65, at 300.
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By conceiving of "habilitation" as training to enable the individual
to cope with his environment,73 the court was closely approximating
the definition of "education" as adopted by the courts in Brown and
P.A.R.C. When Wyatt is read with the right to education cases, it
is established that the state is responsible for the educational care
of all retarded children, no matter what their degree of retardation
or physical debility, and no matter where they are living, whether
at home or in an institution.
In future years, as more and more exceptional children are edu-
cated within the public school system, the need for facilities like
Wyatt's Partlow will diminish. Militating against the facilities'
continued existence in their present state are the judicial and educa-
tional mandates that children must be treated in the least restric-
tive setting.74 This approach is therapeutically valid,75 because
even good institutionalization leads to deterioration and makes it
more difficult for the individual to cope with the outside world.76
Perhaps in recognition of this trend, Wyatt set standards 77 which
required formulation of post-institutional plans for each resident of
a state facility. The plans were to be based on individual diagnostic
evaluations and were to embody professionally approved principles
of normalization and the constitutional principle of the least restric-
tive alternative. 8 In addition, the court objectively set measurable
and judicially enforceable standards for what constituted adequate
treatment. However, as in Mills and P.A.R.C., the changes required
by the Wyatt court in order to make conditions at Partlow constitu-
tionally acceptable involved enormous fiscal and personnel de-
mands, among them being the hiring of 300 additional personnel
within thirty days. Adding to the difficulty in implementing Wyatt
73. Emphasis upon this aspect of education will have an impact on eval-
uative techniques used to measure the child's intellectual ability. See
Section IV A infra.
74. Residents shall have a right to the least restrictive conditions
necessary to achieve the purposes of habilitation. To this end,
the institution shall make every attempt to move residents
from (1) more to less structured living; (2) larger to smaller
facilities; (3) larger to smaller living units; (4) group to in-
dividual residence; (5) segregated from the community to in-
tegrated into the community living; (6) dependent to inde-
pendent living.
344 F. Supp. at 396. This scheme is comparable to the Cascade System
described in Section IV A infra. See also note 32 supra.
75. It is also fiscally prudent. See Section IV C infra.
76. COUNCIL FOR EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN, LEGAL CHANGE FOR THE HANDI-
CAPPED THROUGH LITIGATION (A. Abeson ed. 1973).
77. The court considered the right to treatment to be sufficiently impor-
tant to permit it to inquire into the issue of adequacy of treatment.
78. 344 F. Supp. at 396.
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was the potential bureaucratic bickering between the Department
of Welfare, which operated Partlow, and the Department of Educa-
tion, the agency most familiar with proper programs to be used at
the state facility.
As Wyatt demonstrated, there are no easy answers to the prob-
lems in this or other cases. However, exposure of the difficulties
serves to keep lay and professional advocates alert. Courts may
rule on legal theory, but implementation is a slow process, requiring
constant vigilance by lay people and experts to ensure compliance.
C. Challenge to Testing Procedures
The court in P.A.R.C. evidenced its concern with the due process
problems that confront handicapped children,79 such as providing
notice and a hearing before a child is placed in a special education
class or designated as being in need of specialized training. Due
process also requires periodic reevaluations and additional notice
and hearing requirements before the child is transferred into or out
of special education placement. All these intricate protections are
designed to keep the system "honest" and insure that placement has
a valid basis in fact.
Once it is conceded that handicapped children are educable, and,
therefore, do have a right to a public education already afforded to
other children, the primary concern of educators, parents and the
courts should be that these children receive an appropriate educa-
tion. In the long run, appropriateness is dependent upon develop-
ment of meaningful educational programs, but initially it is predi-
cated upon proper evaluative techniques. Developing such proce-
dures is the task for the psychologist, with encouragement from the
courts.
A common psychologist's and educator's tool in the past has been
the I.Q. test. However, I.Q. tests increasingly have been under at-
tack in the courts8" by children of ethnic, cultural, or socio-economic
79. See notes 37-41 and accompanying text supra.
80. I.Q. tests, as the determining tools for placement in special education,
have been challenged as being violative of the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. The due process ar-
gument is similar to that put forth in P.A.R.C.: Children who may be
placed in special education classes are entitled to notice, a hearing, and
educationally valid evaluative procedures. Equal protection, the argu-
ment goes, is denied when children placed in special education classes
are not provided with educational opportunities comparable to those
afforded to all other children. This argument seems particularly co-
gent if one subscribes to the beliefs that handicapped children learn
better in the regular than in the special classroom, and that they do
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minorities who allege that the tests have improperly labelled them
as in need of special education. There is an increasing amount of
case law in this area, with each new case adding to a patchwork of
judicial determinations as to what is an invalid tQ. test. It re-
mains for the psychologist to develop a new testing procedure
which will correct the faults in the I.Q. test and reasonably evalu-
ate student ability.81
Hobson v. Hansen82 was the first case to consider the validity of
standardized tests, although ostensibly dealing with the legal impli-
cations of ability grouping.83 Judge Skelly Wright struck down a
"tracking" system used in the District of Columbia public schools,
and criticized the system itself for locking children into the track in
which they had been placed. In addition, he focused his attention
on the manner in which children were sorted-teacher observation
and standardized testing. As to the former, the court said that the
whole system was predicated on the assumption ". . . that school
personnel can with reasonable accuracy ascertain the maximum po-
tential of each student and fix the content and pace of his education
accordingly. If this premise proves false, the theory of the track
system collapses .... ,,14 As for using the standardized aptitude
test to categorize students, expert testimony showed that such tests
created a "substantial risk of [the student's] being wrongly la-
belled."8 5 For this reason, the court concluded that such tests were
completely inappropriate for use with a large segment of the stu-
dent body. Because these tests are standardized primarily on and
are relevant to a white middle class group of students, they produce
inaccurate and misleading test scores when given to lower class and
Negro students. As a result, rather than being classified according
to their ability to learn, these students are in reality being classified
according to their socio-economic or racial status, or-more pre-
cisely-according to environmental and psychological factors which
have nothing to do with innate ability.86
not hinder the academic progress of normal children. See Section IV
A infra. Furthermore, improper testing devices tend to create overin-
clusive classifications, in that when students are miscategorized, the
normal may be grouped with the handicapped.
81. The critical question is, "Ability to do what?" Before this question
can be satisfactorily answered, the goals of education must be defined.
Only then can tests be devised that will fairly evaluate the child's po-
tential. See Sections IV A and B infra.
82. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
83. The educational opportunity cases that followed Brown had all dealt
with racial segregation. Hobson was also unique in intimating that
the Brown holding could be extended to encompass non-black poor
children who are denied equal educational opportunities.
84. 269 F. Supp. at 474.
85. Id. at 489.
86. Id. at 514.
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Because most of the students adversely affected by the tracking
system were black, the court stressed the discriminatory effects of
the system and the resultant de facto segregation. Due to this
physical segregation into different tracks, 87 the system brought a
disparity of educational opportunity, with students in lower tracks
receiving a watered-down curriculum. 8
Despite language regarding equal educational opportunity in
Hobson, the primary focus of this decision was on the testing proce-
dure, not the tracking system as such. Tracking as practiced in the
District of Columbia was to be abolished, but only because of the
type of evaluative scheme used to channel students into the system.
A later court of appeals decision limited the applicability of the
Hobson court order to the existing tracking system while permitting
"full scope .. .ability grouping." 89 Therefore, according to this
court, segregation because of ability grouping was proper provided
that valid evaluative tools were used.
Whereas Hobson stressed the socio-economic and racial bias of
I.Q. tests, the next case focused on test bias against ethnic minori-
ties. The plaintiffs in Diana v. State Board of Education',, were
Mexican-Americans who alleged that they had been improperly
placed in classes for the educable mentally retarded ("EMR").
They contended that I.Q. tests used for placement had an inherent
cultural bias because they focused on English verbal skills and had
been standardized on a population comprised entirely of white,
native-born Americans. Statistical evidence was introduced to show
the disparate effect the tests had on Mexican-Americans. For exam-
ple, although children of this heritage made up only 13 per cent of
the school population in Monterey County, California, they com-
prised almost 30 per cent of the children enrolled in the EMR pro-
gram." The defendant school board brought the case to a conclu-
87. This differs from the pre-Brown educational systems that, it was con-
tended, provided separate, but equal educational opportunities.
88. 269 F. Supp. at 449.
89. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
90. Civil No. C-70 37 RFP (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 1970 and June 18, 1973). The
plaintiffs, nine Mexican-American children, came from homes in which
Spanish was the chief language spoken. On their initial attempt, their
I.Q. test scores were low. When they were retested in Spanish, seven
of the nine scored higher than the I.Q. level used to determine mental
retardation.
91. Studies by the California State Department of Education showed that
in 1966-67, of the 85,000 children in classes for the EMR in California,
Spanish-surnamed children comprised 26% while accounting for only
13% of the total school population. Weintraub & Abeson, Appropriate
Education for all Handicapped Children: A Growing Issue, 23 SYRA-
CUSE L. REV. 1037, 1052 (1972).
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sion out of court in a stipulated settlement. It agreed to test all
children in their primary language, to re-test those currently
enrolled in EMR classes, to submit a written report explaining
the percentage disparity between Mexican-Americans in the total
school, population and in EMR classes,92 and to undertake imme-
diate efforts to develop and standardize an appropriate I.Q. test.
Covarrubias v. San Diego Unified School District,93 although
similar to Diana in legal arguments, was significantly different in
two other respects. First, it sought money damages as a possible
remedy under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 9 4 Second, its plaintiffs
were black. As a result of the finding that the tests were racially
biased, revised tests to be used within California were to have not
only adjustments for language differences, but also recognition of
the cultural influence of the black ghetto.
In subsequent, similar litigation, black Californians in Larry P.
v. Riles9" went one step further and demanded that black psycholo-
gists and psychometrists be hired, attacking the tests per se as well
as the tests as administered. 96 Here, as in Diana, it was shown that
the I.Q. tests had the effect of classifying a disproportionate number
of black children as retarded. In this manner, the existence of de
92. An annual report was required showing the ethnic breakdown of chil-
dren in special education classes. The proportion of minority children
in these classes could vary up to 15% from their proportion in the
general school population.
93. Civil No. 70-394-T (S.D. Cal., Feb. 1971).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
95. 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972). In this case, statistical information
showed that a disproportionate number of black children were en-
rolled in programs for the retarded in San Francisco Unified School
District: 25.5% of the school population were black, while 66% of
the children in the EMR programs were black.
The claim that the tests were culturally biased and the request for
more empathetic testers were made with evidence showing that
when they were given the same I.Q. tests but with special at-
tempts by the psychologists to establish rapport with the test-
takers . . . to reword items in terms more consistent with
plaintiffs' cultural background, and to give credit for non-
standard answers which nevertheless showed an intelligent
approach to problems in the context of that background,
plaintiffs scored significantly higher than the mental retarda-
tion cut-off point.
Id. at 1308.
96. A recently filed case, Strickland v. Deerfield Pub. School Dist. No. 109,
Civil No. 73 L 284 (Cir. Ct., Lake County, Ill., filed 1974) presages liti-
gation concerning the examiner's duty of reasonable care. The case
involved allegations that professionals had failed to diagnose properly
a perceptually handicapped child's problem, and that they would have
been able to do so had they exercised reasonable care.
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facto racial discrimination was established, 7 and the burden of
proof shifted to the defendants to show that the tests were ration-
ally related to the purpose of evaluating the student's ability to
learn.9 8
The defendants could not meet this burden in spite of the asser-
tion of several defenses. The first was that the school district did
not rely solely on the test in classifying children. The court, in re-
sponse, held that it was sufficient that "substantial emphasis" was
placed on the test results.99 The court also rejected the defendant's
second contention that the parental consent required before a child
could be placed in a special class barred the parent from complain-
ing. In so doing it acknowledged that such consent tends to be pro
forma because of parental awe of the educational process. 10 0 The
defendants' last assertion was that ". . . since black people tend to
be poor, and poor pregnant women tend to suffer from inadequate
nutrition, it is possible that the brain development of many black
children had been retarded by their mothers' poor diet during preg-
nancy,"''1 and that this would explain the disproportionate number
of black children in classes for the EMR. The court dismissed this
by refusing to assume "otherwise than that the ability to learn is
randomly spread about the population.' u0 2
The result of this litigation was that the San Francisco School
District was enjoined
from placing black students in classes for the educable mentally re-
tarded on the basis of criteria which rely primarily on the results of
I.Q. tests as they are currently administered, if the consequence of
use of such criteria is racial imbalance in the composition of such
classes.' 03
97. 343 F. Supp. at 1311.
98. By using this approach, the court was not adhering to either the strict
scrutiny or the rational basis test. Under the strict scrutiny test, the
burden at this point would have shifted to the defendant to show a
compelling state interest justifying the classification. Under the ra-
tional basis test, the burden would have been on the plaintiff to show
that the classification was irrational. Id. at 1308-09.
99. Id. at 1312.
100. [P]arents are likely to be overawed by scientific-sounding
pronouncements about I.Q.; and if their decisions whether to
provide their consent are so colored by I.Q. results, then the
I.Q. tests again appear as prime determinants of EMR [Edu-
cable Mentally Retarded] placement. Furthermore, if the I.Q.
tests are found in fact to be biased against the culture and
experience of black children, any consent which is obtained
from the parents of such children absent communication of
full information to that effect is not effective -consent.
Id. at 1313.
101. Id. at 1310.
102. Id. at 1311.
103. Id. at 1315. As a result .of a supplementary order approved on De-
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Stewart v. Phillips,10 4 though in the mold of Covarrubias, also
followed in the path of Hobson by including among its plaintiffs'0 5
racially and socio-economically disadvantaged children. By so
structuring the plaintiff class, an attempt was made to seek ac-
knowledgement of black culture and poverty as determinants of test
performance. In addition to asking for a damage remedy, 0 6 the
plaintiffs also sought the establishment of a State Commission of
Individual and Educational Needs to devise new tests and programs.
Such a request would have caused the court to take positive correc-
tive measures and not merely act in a punitive role. In this case,
the basic issues were made moot by the Department of Education's
issuance of new regulations providing for detailed evaluation before
placement.
In reflecting on the litigation concerning test procedures, several
patterns emerge that are similar to those found in the right to edu-
cation and right to treatment areas. First, in both areas the number
of new cases being brought before the courts' 0 7 is indicative of the
tedious process that must be followed before full and meaningful
educational rights for the retarded can be achieved. Second, the
cases show the necessity for interested parties to maintain constant
vigilance to assure compliance with court orders and party agree-
ments. Third, the courts have essentially functioned in a punitive
rather than a remedial capacity. They have ordered past injustices
to cease, but generally are unable or unwilling to involve them-
selves in long-range remediation, deferring to those with expertise
in given areas. Last, implementation of the decisions in both areas
requires a vast expenditure of finances and human energy. For ex-
cember 13, 1974,
the California State Board of Education disapproved its
list of verbal and nonverbal standardized individual intelli-
gence tests for placement of children into classes for the edu-
cable mentally retarded. Thus, the state discontinued using
tests for such placement for all children, even though the
court order applied only to black children.
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, MENTAL RETARDA-
TION AND THE LAW 9 (June 1975).
104. Civil No. 70-1199-F (D. Mass. 1970). The formulation of new state
regulations for placement in special education program may have
mooted the issue presented in this case.
105. The plaintiffs had been placed in classes for the mentally retarded.
After litigation was initiated, and upon subsequent testing by inde-
pendent psychologists, they were found not to be retarded.
106. As in Covarrubias, punitive damages were requested.
107. See also Guadalupe Organization, Inc. v. Tempe Elementary School
Dist. No. 3, Civil No. 71-435 PHX (D. Ariz., May 9, 1972); Ruiz v. State
Bd. of Educ., Civil No. 218294 (Super. Ct., Sacramento County, Cal.,
filed Dec. 16, 1971).
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ample, in the placement process alone, new tests will have to be de-
vised to take into account cultural or socio-economic variables and
old tests need to be restandardized over more representative popu-
lations, demanding large expenditures of time and money.
IV. AN APPROPRIATE EDUCATION
Once it has been established that the exceptional child can learn,
and, therefore, is entitled to a publicly funded education, propo-
nents of this child's educational right need to concentrate on ensur-
ing that he receives an appropriate education. Because the educa-
tional system was so long in responding to the needs of the excep-
tional child, doing so only with judicial prompting, it is reasonable
to assume that development of qualitative programs will also be
slow and that resort to the judiciary may again be necessary. How-
ever, it is uncertain whether the courts will be willing or able to re-
spond to allegations of inappropriate educational opportunity. But
before any qualitative assessment of programs developed for the
handicapped child can be attempted, courts must first examine the
judicial conception of education.
A. The Court's View of Education
Modern courts first became embroiled in educational conflicts in
the context of racial discrimination. The Brown pronouncement on
education is often quoted:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and
the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recogni-
tion of the importance of education to our democratic society. It
is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibili-
ties, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of
good citizenship. Today, it is a principle instrument in awakening
the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be ex-
pected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an edu-
cation. 08
This statement ostensibly views education as both a socialization
process to train the child so that he will adjust normally to his envi-
ronment and an academic experience to prepare him for a profes-
sion and future success in life. Within this conceptualization, we
again see the group-individual dichotomy in our educational struc-
ture which was alluded to earlier.10 9
108. 347 U.S. at 493 (emphasis added).
109. See Section IIA supra.
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Socialization involves what is good for the system while aca-
demic achievement is primarily concerned with what is best for the
individual, although it does have the tangential effect of aiding soci-
ety. In this context, "system" refers not only to the educational
system but also to our whole way of life. The socialization facet of
education best serves the educational system and our governmental
needs; however, the academic aspect, with its maximizing of indi-
vidual potential, can be disruptive to the system. It is costly be-
cause it involves hiring additional personnel, developing innovative
programs, and purchasing varied supplies; and it is threatening-or
challenging-because it necessitates a change in educational phil-
osophy and teaching methods.
Later court decisions have ignored the academic facet of educa-
tion and stressed the socialization aspect. Closer analysis of even
the Brown statement within the factual context of that particular
case shows that the Court there essentially ascribed to the philoso-
phy that education is a socializing process. The focus of the Court's
inquiry was on access to education. The issue was not whether
black children had been given a quality education or whether the
same amount of money was spent to educate black students as was
expended on the education of white pupils. Instead, it was con-
cerned solely with ensuring that all children had an equal educa-
tional opportunity, and, therefore, it held that children could not
learn to cope with a complex environment in a segregated setting.1 10
Defining education in terms of coping with the environment has
been a boon to proponents of the handicapped child's right to re-
ceive an education. If education were to be conceived of as an aca-
demic experience, then such a child might be able to be excluded
from school because the level of his potential academic achievement
is often low. However, this is not the case. Rather, the theme of
education as a socializing experience has been endorsed by the right
to education and right to treatment cases referred to in this com-
ment and by the Supreme Court as well. So it is that Wyatt talks
of habilitation treatment as
the process by which the staff of the institution assists the resident
to acquire and maintain those life skills which enable him to cope
more effectively with the demands of his own person and his en-
vironment and to raise the level of his physical, mental, and social
efficiency. Habilitation includes but is not limited to programs of
formal, structured education and treatment. 1 1
and expert witnesses in P.A.R.C. testified that all mentally retarded
110. Using this approach, one could as easily have argued that white chil-
dren were being deprived of equal educational opportunities.
111. 344 F. Supp. at 395 (emphasis added).
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persons are capable of benefiting from a program of education and
training.112
In Wisconsin v. Yoder" 3 the Court also endorsed a similar defini-
tion of education by stating in dictum that "the value of all educa-
tion must be assessed in terms of its capacity to prepare the child
for life."'1 4 This is consistent with the Court's holding that an
Amish child could withdraw from school after having completed the
eighth grade, while all other children in Wisconsin had to attend
school until the age of sixteen. This diverse treatment was justified
because the training an Amish child received at home would par-
allel the skills he would have learned at school.
Although education has been defined in general terms as train-
ing the individual to cope with his environment, some qualitative
standards of appropriateness need to be set up to evaluate educa-
tional programs and see if they are achieving their goals. Based on
Rodriguez, it is uncertain whether the courts will be willing or able
to respond to allegations that an inappropriate education is being
afforded to an exceptional child. In that case the Court would not
concern itself with an investigation into the qualitative inequities in
the education being afforded to different children within the same
school district. It halted its inquiry once it was assured that there
was no denial of education and that the education being provided
was "minimal" and "adequate." 1 5 Arguably, "minimal" and "ade-
112. 334 F. Supp. at 1359.
113. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
114. Id. at 222 (dictum).
115. Similarly, if in a criminal law case the defendant argues that his coun-
sel was ineffective, a court will not second guess counsel's judgment,
nor will it require that his judgment have been errorless; rather, coun-
sel's representation need only have put the defendant in a better posi-
tion than he would have been in had he not had counsel. It may be
argued, however, that, just as a defendant should have counsel that ac-
tually represents his interests, the right to an education should mean
the right to an education that actually educates.
Another approach that can be adopted to prod the courts into ruling
on "appropriateness" is the use of the quid pro quo analysis of the
right to treatment cases: Children who give up their freedom should
in return receive an appropriate education. Education has already been
recognized as being similar to treatment. See notes 72 & 73 supra and
accompanying text. Compulsory education statutes can be construed
as subjecting the child to involuntary confinement. Furthermore,
when schools fail to provide an adequate education, they may be com-
pared to other institutions that infringe on constitutionally protected
freedoms. McClung, "Do Handicapped Children Have a Legal Right to
a Minimally Adequate Education?," 3 J.L. & EDuc. 153, 162 (1974).
If a court were willing to adopt this approach, it could, like the Wyatt
court, consider itself empowered to make qualitative inquiries regard-
ing treatment, and to set up governing standards.
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quate" are basal standards and indicate the Court's willingness to
make some kind of a determination regarding quality. However,
militating against the Court's undertaking even this minimal in-
quiry is its indicated reluctance to become embroiled in questions of
educational policy and its preference for deferring to the wisdom of
experts." 0
Another qualitative attack that can be made on the appropriate-
ness of educational programs that are available to handicapped chil-
dren centers on the allegation that the program is so inappropriate
that it is the equivalent of total denial of education. Though this
is seemingly an onerous burden, the Rodriguez Court did imply that
it would scrutinize situations where there was a denial of education.
An additional tactic is available in those states having constitu-
tional provisions that mandate a free public education in qualitative
terms, such as the "thorough and efficient" standard in the New
Jersey Constitution." 7 In this situation, courts, like the one in Rob-
inson v. Cahill,"8 could interpret such terms as imposing qualitative
standards to be used in jiidging the calibre of the public education
being afforded to the handicapped child.
Two recent decisions indicate that by relying on certain statutes,
courts can determine that a particular child is not receiving an ef-
fective education. In Lau v. Nichols," 9 the Supreme Court held
that the failure of the San Francisco School District to provide
English language instruction to non-English-speaking Chinese stu-
dents violated section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.120 By so
doing, it implied that a child's mere presence in the classroom is not
enough to constitute an "education." If he cannot benefit from the
regular program of instruction, then the necessary special services
must be made available to him. In arriving at this position, the
Court stressed that equality of treatment did not mean precise
equality, but rather could encompass special treatment for children
who were unequal.' 2 ' The second case, Kivell v. Nemoitin, 22 in-
116. See note 54 supra.
117. Similar language appears in the constitutions of 25 states: Arizona,
Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Comment, su-
pra note 51, at 107 n.113.
118. 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
119. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).
121. [T]here is no equality of treatment merely by providing stu-
dents with the same facilities, textbooks, teachers and curricu-
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volved an interpretation of Connecticut's special education law
which provided for a program suited to the child's "needs." By
strictly construing this "needs" language, the judge was able to hold
that the defendant Board of Education had not offered an appropri-
ate special education program for a twelve year old perceptually
handicapped child.
12 3
Despite the various legal attacks that can be made, the outcome
of such litigation is uncertain. Therefore, it appears that the best
method for achieving qualitative and appropriate educational pro-
grams for the handicapped child is through the continued vigilance
and lobbying efforts of parents and concerned educators.
B. An Educational Program for the Handicapped Child
In Rodriguez the Court indicated its reluctance to interject itself
as the final authority in disputes dealing with controversial and di-
vergent educational theories. Nowhere is controversy more preva-
lent than among educators of the handicapped child who espouse
the merits of different educational settings. At one end of the spec-
trum are those who ascribe to the normalization-mainstreaming
principle,1 2 4 while on the other are the educators who favor the self-
contained special education classroom.
lum: for students who do not understand English are effec-
tively foreclosed from any meaningful education.
414 U.S. at 566.
122. Civil No. 143913 (Super. Ct. Fairfield County, Conn., filed July 18,
1972).
123. The judge awarded the boy's mother $13,400 to pay for the out-of-state
private education that the child had received for the previous two
years.
124. Under this concept, children are educated in the "least restrictive set-
ting." One part of mainstreaming is the Cascade System. The flow
of services to the handicapped child increases as the educational set-
ting becomes more restrictive:
Less Severe Regular Classroom Return as soonas possible
I. Regular classroom with specialist consultation
II. Regular classroom with itinerant teachers
III. Regular classroom plus a resource roomPart Time Special Class
Full Time Special Class
Special Day School
Residential School Move only as
More Severe Hospital far as necessary
In Modification I, the classroom teacher herself seeks improved
techniques to aid the student; in II, itinerant specialists work with the
child. Modification III places the child in the regular classroom, but
provides time for him to receive specific remedial instruction. Wein-
traub & Abeson, supra note 39, at 1040-41.
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The proponents of mainstreaming advocate educating the handi-
capped child in a regular school program because it is undesirable
to segregate children if one wishes them to develop as normally as
possible. It is theorized that placing the exceptional child in an en-
vironment where he is totally surrounded by other abnormal chil-
dren will further hinder whatever potential for normalcy that he
has in terms of social, emotional, cognitive and language develop-
ment. In mainstreaming, provision is made for the child to receive
appropriate supportive services for up to half of his school day, with
the other half of the day spent in a regular classroom situation. The
scheme is important not only to the exceptional child but also to the
normal child because interacting on a daily basis with non-normals
will prepare him for later years when he will have to cope with an
environment in which there are individuals of varied and varying
abilities. Ostensibly, this system allows for every child to develop
to his maximum potential by treating all children "equally."
The language used by the educator to justify mainstreaming
closely parallels legal theory, particularly in alluding to the unde-
sirability of segregating children. The analogy between handicaped
children and pre-Brown black children has been made. Both are
disadvantaged minorities and both have been excluded from the
regular public school classroom. If the purpose of the educational
process is to help the individual adapt to his environment, then this
goal will be undermined by attempting to train the child in a one-
dimensional segregated setting. Just as educating black children in
an all-black school denied them equal educational opportunity, so
too can segregating a handicapped child in a special education class-
room with other handicapped children be considered as denying him
an opportunity to adjust to his environment.
After Brown, segregation of black children could not be toler-
ated even if it were shown to be in their best interest.12 5 In the case
of the handicapped child, it is even uncertain whether a self-con-
tained special education class is advantageous. Its existence rests
on the assumption that it provides a more individualized curricu-
lum 1 2 6 and shelters the handicapped child from possible emotional
125. In Stell v. Savannah-Chatham Co. Bd. of Educ., 318 F.2d 425 (5th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, Gibson v. Harris, 376 U.S. 908 (1964), psychological
and educational evidence was offered to show that segregation had a
more beneficial effect on black children than did integration. The
court, however, said that Brown established as a matter of law that
segregation is inherently unequal, and that segregated programs can-
not be justified even if they provide a more adequate education and
a better psychological experience for students. See Section IVC infra.
126. Cohen & DeYoung, supra. note 20, at 261.
674 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 55, NO. 4 (1976)
trauma.' 2 7 Furthermore, teaching a homogeneous group is thought
to be desirable because in theory each child is challenged according
to his ability. However, the justification for the special education-
homogeneous grouping is completely undermined by "[e] ducational
efficacy studies [that] generally find either no effect or marginal
adverse effects on achievement and attitude for students who are
classified, when these students are compared with non-grouped
peers.' 2 8 In addition, it has been shown that though "programs for
the severely handicapped do benefit children, . . . classes for the
mildly retarded and mildly emotionally disturbed do not serve those
children better than regular class placement.' 29
The dispute over the relative merits of the segregated homogene-
ous learning situation and the integrated heterogeneous classroom
is really a replay of the conflict between what is good for a smooth-
ly functioning system and what is beneficial for the individual. Os-
tensibly, homogeneous groupings are best for the individual, but as
was shown, 10 in reality they are not. They exist because they best
serve the orderliness of the system. Heterogeneous groups are de-
nounced because the level of the class is adjusted to the normal
learner, and therefore, children who deviate from the norm suffer.
Such a scheme, according to its opponents neither helps the indi-
vidual nor the system. In actuality, such a method potentially af-
fords the individual great opportunity for social growth by exposing
him to all kinds of people while at the same time not causing him
any intellectual harm. However, this environment, though good for
the individual, is threatening to the system. It challenges existing
teaching methods which focus on the lecture presentation geared to
one ability level and demands new techniques, such as open class-
rooms, programmed learning, and pupil-to-pupil tutoring.' '
Special education classes are an inappropriate learning setting
not only because they hinder the individual's socialization skills,
while affording little compensatory academic benefit, but also be-
cause of the concept of the self-fulfilling prophecy. The court in
Hobson v. Hansen described this phenomenon in the following way:
127. "Those favoring segregation speak of the special psychological vul-
nerabilities of the retarded, the deleterious effect on their self-esteem
that direct comparison and competition with others would bring, and
the greater efficiency in separate service delivery and consequent in-
dividualized attention." Burt, supra note 65, at 314.
128. Kirp, Schools as Sorters: The Constitutional and Policy Implications
of Student Classification, 121 U. PENN. L. Ray. 705, 718 (1973).
129. Id. at 728.
130. See notes 128 and 129 supra and accompanying text.
131. Comment, Toward a Legal Theory of the Right to Education of the
Mentally Retarded, 34 Omio ST. L.J. 554, 576 (1973).
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When a child is "treated as if he is uneducable because he has a low
test score, he becomes uneducable and the low test score is thereby
reinforced."'1 32 A child who is designated as being in need of special
education placement understands the implications of this and acts
according to what is expected of him. He is surrounded by children
who deviate from the norm in terms of development, and, therefore,
he has no role model to pattern himself after. In the special educa-
tion class he is also not being challenged by his peers. Compound-
ing this unfortunate situation is the fact that special education
courses, in contrast to regular classes, are nonsequential 3 3 Because
of the difference in teaching methods, even if a child in a special ed-
ucation class is retested, he remains locked into his place because he
will be compared with children of his own chronological age who
continue to advance more rapidly than he because of the progressive
education they are receiving.
While the segregation cases may furnish the legal support to jus-
tify abandonment of the special education class as an educational
setting (except for the more severely retarded child) and adoption
of the concept of mainstreaming, there is a potential danger in this
approach. It arises from too literal reliance on the concept of
"equal educational opportunity" 1 as applied to the handicapped
child. In most cases he can never be equal (identical) to other chil-
132. 269 F. Supp. at 484.
133. Comment, supra note 131, at 579.
134. [M]any judicial decisions ... still define equality on a
"sameness" doctrine, equal resources to "children whose needs
are unequal." Such a philosophy may have been appropriate
for a society that was based on family economic production
that could absorb those who could not compete equally in the
nation's economic system. Today, however, the education of a
child is a community concern, for if he is not given skills suf-
ficient for economic participation, then he will become de-
pendent upon the community.
Weintraub & Abeson, supra note 39, at 1055. See also note 121 and ac-
companying text supra.
"Equality" in -the context of education for the handicapped child
has different implications than "equality" in other surroundings.
The concept of equality is often interpreted to imply that the
government should treat everyone in a like manner. While
this approach should certainly apply to due process considera-
tions, the question becomes more complicated when applied to
government sponsored services, since no two individuals are
exactly alike. It may be argued that in certain circumstances
equality should be measured in terms of providing equal ac-
cess to appropriate services, rather than in terms of providing
only an equal distribution of resources. This might mean pro-
viding additional or more intensive educational training for
mentally retarded persons.
Comment, Educational Equality for the Mentally Retarded, 23 SYRA-
CUSE L. REv. 141, 1162 (1972).
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dren, yet the financial and time costs of educating him will be dis-
proportionately higher than those of training a normal child.13 5
However, it must be remembered that the amount of money being
spent on education does not affect the concept of "equality." In
pre-Brown Topeka, equal expenditures were made to educate black
and white children; this did not ensure equality. And in Rodriguez,
unequal amounts of money were being spent to educate children;
this did not result in inequality. Equality also cannot be defined in
terms of the amount of output that results from the educational
process. The reason for this is the obvious difference in achieve-
ment level from individual to individual. Furthermore, it would be
societally disastrous if everyone had the same achievement poten-
tial.
"Equal" in the phrase "equal educational opportunity" is not the
key word. The emphasis instead should be on "opportunity." 130
The purpose of the educational system then becomes furnishing
each child with an equal opportunity to develop as far as his innate
135. There may also be inequality as to the age at which a handicapped
child should begin his public education:
[M]ost states do not accept children into the public school
system until age five or six. Yet by the time retarded children
reach this age, they are already behind normal children in
terms of learhing ability. Whereas normal children have been
able to develop at home the basic tools necessary for formal
school education, the families of the retarded usually cannot
provide the more specialized teaching in the home that their
children require in order to develop those same tools.
Comment, supra note 134, at 1163.
The handicapped have a special need for an education that begins
at an early age and continues into early adulthood, since they are not
governed by the same developmental rules as normal children. THE
MENTAL HEALTH LAW PROJECT, PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, LEGAL
RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED VOL. 2, 835 (B. Ennis & P.
Friedman, eds. 1973). Since most compulsory education statutes have
upper and lower age limits within which the state will provide educa-
tion, it may be necessary to amend them to permit education for the
handicapped to begin earlier and end later.
136. "Opportunity" means access. One author has argued that
equal educational opportunity, as a constitutional standard,
should include both equal access to appropriate services and
to equal minimal results. If this "minimal" education is seen
as the minimum amount necessary to the meaningful exercise
of first amendment rights .... one's right is not the right to
the "meaningful exercise of first amendment rights" actual-
ized, but, rather, one's right is the right to approach such an
exercise, i.e., the right to get as far as one is able toward the
minimum.
Handel, The Role of the Advocate in Securing the Handicapped Child's
Right to an Effective Minimal Education, 36 Omio ST. L.J. 349, 355
(1975).
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capabilities will permit.'3 7 This is the concept now being utilized
by the courts in the right to education cases. 138
So it is that educational and legal theory both seem to indicate
that for the handicapped child an "equal educational opportunity"
can best occur in a regular classroom setting139 with support per-
sonnel to be made available when necessary.
C. Valid Placement Tests
Before the handicapped child can have an appropriate educa-
tional program developed for him, he must be objectively tested to
measure his educational potential. The cases challenging testing
procedures have established that specific I.Q. tests are invalid as
evaluative tools to be used on children belonging to racial, cultural,
or socio-economic minorities because they do not measure such
child's ability to cope with his own environment. The mandate for
psychologists is to develope new tests. Focus for this task is pro-
vided by the definition of what is education; therefore, the tests
must be designed to assess the child's realized and potential ability
to learn to cope with his environment. This emphasis comports
with the definition of mental retardation which has been adopted
by the American Association of Mental Deficiency, namely, that
"[m]ental retardation refers to sub-average general intellectual
functioning which originates during the developmental period and
is associated with impairment in adaptive behavior."'140
The results of a twelve year study of mental retardation con-
ducted in Riverside, California' 4' substantiated the validity of this
approach. It concluded that currently used assessment procedures
violate certain basic rights of children, 42 and that a system of
137. Comment, supra note 131, at 572. "Educational equality should be de-
fined as equality of access to different resources to attain different in-
dividual goals." Weintraub & Abeson, supra note 39, at 1056.
138. In P.A.R.C., the court ordered Pennsylvania to provide every retarded
person between the ages of six and twenty-one with "access to a free
public program of education and training appropriate to his learning
capacities." 334 F. Supp. at 1258-66 (emphasis added). And in Mills,
the District of Columbia had to provide plaintiffs with a publicly sup-
ported education suited to their needs. 348 F. Supp. at 878.
139. See note 4 supra.
140. Mercer, A Policy Statement on Assessment Procedures and the Rights
of Children, in ANNUAL PROGRESS IN CHILD PSYCHIATRY AND CHILD DE-
VELOPMFNT 1975, 23 (S. Chess & A. Thomas eds. 1975).
141. See Mercer, supra note 140.
142. These included the right to be avaluated within a culturally appropri-
ate normative framework, the right to be assessed as a multi-dimen-
sional human being, the right to be fully educated, the right to be free
of stigmatizing labels, and the right to ethnic identity and respect.
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"pluralistic, multi-cultural assessment" is needed. 1 43  Such an ap-
proach would have to consider adaptive behavior and socio-cultural
background, as well as intelligence, when interpreting the meaning
of scores on standardized tests. These conclusions correlate with
the judicial decisions in this area which have not only attacked tests
as being Anglocentric, but have also criticized rigid testing tech-
niques.14 4
The tests currently being used are valid insofar as they accom-
plish what they were designed to do, namely, predict performance
in an Anglocentric public school system. They are modelled after
a test developed by Alfred Binet and Theodore Simon to identify
French children who would not benefit from a regular school pro-
gram. Items for their test were selected from aspects of French cul-
ture which they believed that all French children would have had
an opportunity to learn about. The test was a selection device and
not a measure of intelligence per se. The mistake made in adapting
the test for use in America was twofold. First, America, unlike
France, is a nation inhabited by people of diverse racial, cultural
and ethnic backgrounds; therefore, it is difficult to select test items
with which all American children will have had an opportunity to
become familiar. Second, in the adaptation, the original purpose of
the test was overlooked. In France, education was not made avail-
able to all and a screening device was necessary to decide who
would and would not benefit from schooling, whereas in America
education is universal. The Binet measures present academic
achievement, while American educators should be more interested
in potential for growth. The fault of the test is that it is essentially
retrospective rather than prospective.
143. Mercer, supra note 140, at 21.
144. The following examples illustrate some of the pitfalls that attend rigid
adherence to testing procedures, and point out how test scores can rise
when examiners are flexible.
When a tester administers the Wechsler Pre-school Primary Scale
of Intelligence Sentence Repetition Subtest and asks a child to repeat
"It is raining outside," the traditionalist would credit the child with
successfully completing the task only if the sentence were repeated
verbatim. But what of the child who says, "It's raining," or, "It rains
out?" In the first response, he is repeating the essence of the sentence,
but has used a contraction for "It is," a more sophisticated grammati-
cal construction, for which credit could be given. In the second re-
sponse, if it is not presently raining out, the child may also be evidenc-
ing intelligence in indicating that it does rain outside, though it is not
now raining. Here, too, a better view would be to consider that the
sentence has been repeated.
Examiners need to become more sophisticated in assessment proce-
dures and interpretation, because qualitative interpretation may be
more important than quantitative scoring.
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In view of the definition of education that we are using, a better
test should include some assessment procedure that would consider
the child's ability to perform nonacademic tasks in his home and
neighborhood. This would force the school to appreciate the child
as a human being and would aid it in building a program based on
individual assets and accomplishments rather than one structured
around the child's defects. 1 45  Until such tests are devised, the
tester should at least be aware of the limitations of the evaluative
tool he is using. Also, he should collect a variety of inputs from
family, neighbors, the family physician, teachers and from personal
observations of the child in a nonstructured setting before making
placement decisions.
D. Funding
Three factors are involved in ensuring that the handicapped
child receives an appropriate education: a proper educational set-
ting with available support personnel; valid evaluative testing pro-
cedures; and adequate funding 146 for the classes and tests. Budge-
tary increases to cover the costs of educational services to the handi-
capped are not easily won. There is significant feeling that provid-
ing educational services for the exceptional child is a wasteful ex-
penditure of public funds. 47 Proponents of this position stress that
it is more expensive to educate an exceptional than a normal child,
and that even after he has been educated, his capabilities still do not
approximate those of normal children. There are two fallacies in
this argument. First, it takes a short-range economic view. Sec-
145. Calif. Legis. Senate Bill No. 33 (1971), provides a legal framework for
multicultural pluralistic assessment in the public schools:
Before any minor is admitted to a special education program
for mentally retarded minors . . . the minor shall be given
verbal or nonverbal individual intelligence tests in the pri-
mary home language in which the minor is most fluent and
has the best speaking ability and capacity to understand.
... No minor shall be placed in a special education class for
the mentally retarded if he scores higher than two standard
deviations below the norm....
No minor may be placed in a special education program for
the mentally retarded unless a complete psychological exami-
nation by a credentialed school psychologist investigating
such factors as developmental history, cultural background,
and school achievement substantiates the retarded intellectual
development indicated by the individual test scores. This ex-
amination shall include estimates of adaptive behavior..
Such adaptability testing shall include but is not limited to
a visit, with the consent of the parent or guardian, to the mi-
nor's home by the school psychologist or a person designated
by the chief administrator of the district ....
146. See note 48 supra.
147. One author has said:
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ond, it takes into account neither the purposes of education nor the
disparity among individuals.
Over the long term it will cost the state more money if these
children are not educated. If, instead, they learn how to cope with
and function in their environment, then many will be able to be em-
ployed in some capacity, and, depending on their degree of intellec-
tual impairment, they will either live independently or in a group-
hostel situation with other retarded individuals and supervising
house parents. Those mentally retarded adults who were indepen-
dent and self-supporting would contribute to the economy. Those
who were living in a minimal care setting would require some state
financial support, but less than would be necessary to maintain
them in an institution. Without education, many retarded individu-
als will be doomed to spend their lives languishing in institutions.
Such facilities are costly to maintain and costly in terms of wasted
human potential.
Not only is it in the state's best interest financially to furnish an
appropriate education for the handicapped child, but it is also their
moral duty to maximize each individual's potential for happiness
and human dignity. This latter approach focuses on the true mean-
ing of education: to help the child adjust to his environment as best
he can.1 4 8 By embracing such a philosophy, attention is diverted
Education is more difficult and more expensive for so-called
"ineducable" children, and the possible educational attain-
ments are more modest than for others. On this ground it
may be rational to exclude these children from public educa-
tion. If public commitment to educational funding is limited,
and if public agencies choose to pursue the "excellence of the
few" rather than developing individual capacities for their
own sake, then educational exclusion of the "retarded" might
be justified.
Burt, supra note 65, at 297. He found justification for his position in
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972), which involved a state deci-
sion to reduce federal welfare funds given to families with dependent
children in order to provide greater benefits to the aged and the
physically disabled. But see note 48 and accompanying text supra.
148. Education should not be viewed solely in terms of economic benefits.
The protestant work ethic long used to justify educational and
vocational training efforts on behalf of handicapped persons
may soon give way to a humanistic ethic. As the sanctity of
work loses its potency, as the work week continues to shrink,
as more and more time and energy are *devoted to recreational
and aesthetic pursuits, it may become increasingly irrelevant
to justify services to retarded persons on the basis that they
will be more productive economically. Heroic efforts to ob-
tain some semblance of work from the very severely handi-
capped may no longer seem justified. Instead, services might
be justified on the basis that they will increase the client's
happiness or allow him to participate more fully in the human
experience.
Weintraub & Abeson, supra note 39, at 1061.
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from the economic input and instead is concerned with what is the
output of the educational process, the development of the indi-
vidual.
Thus far the focus has been on theories that may be used to
thwart appropriations. Difficulties also present themselves when
money for special education has been budgeted, but the school dis-
trict in which the child resides does not have a suitable program for
him. Many states solve this problem by contracting with other
school districts or with public or private agencies in other parts of
their state to provide the necessary services. 149 However, in states
having constitutional provisions prohibiting payment of state funds
to private schools, such an approach is foreclosed unless there is a
constitutional amendment.150
Regardless of whether funding problems center around inade-
quate appropriations or unavailability of programs on which to
spend appropriated money, the solution will not be found in the
courts.15' This is an area where improvements can only occur
through concerted and continuous lobbying efforts by concerned in-
dividuals.
149. Typifying such a statute is L.B. 403, passed in 1973 by the 83d Ne-
braska Legislature, 1st Session. It decreed that every school district
provide or contract for special education programs for all resident chil-
dren who could benefit from such programs.
150. L.B. 666, 84th Neb. Legis., 2d Sess. (1976). This bill submits to the
voters a proposal to amend NEB. CoNsT. art. VII, § 11 to permit the
state or one of its political subdivisions to contract with nonpublic
institutions to provide nonsectarian, educational services for handi-
capped children under the age of twenty-one.
151. The arguments over appropriations for special education will probably
soon be moot. Many of the states' financial problems will be solved
by Pub. L. No. 94-142, the Education for All Handicapped Children Act
of 1975. The Act offers a formula according to which the Government
must pay an escalating percentage of the national average expenditure
per public school child, multiplied by the number of handicapped chil-
dren being served in the school districts of each state.
The new law attempts to preclude the mislabelling and over-count-
ing of children as handicapped in order to obtain the largest possible
federal contribution by permitting the labelling as handicapped of no
more than 12% of a state's children between the ages of five and
seventeen.
In fiscal 1978, 50% of each state's entitlement will remain under
the control of the state education agency, with the remaining 50%
"passing through" to the state's local education agencies. There-
after, the amount "passing through" will increase to 75%. In 1976
and 1977, the state agency will control all monies received.
Additionally, the Act authorizes special grants to encourage states
to provide special education services to preschool handicapped chil-
dren.
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V. CONCLUSION
The courts have held that the handicapped child has a right to
be educated within the public school system. He is capable of
learning, and, therefore, there is no rational basis for denying him
a publicly funded education when such an opportunity is being af-
forded to all other children. So it is that the schools which previ-
ously excluded him because he was disruptive to an orderly scheme
must now include him. However, inclusion alone is not sufficient.
For the handicapped child, a meaningful education is one which is
appropriate for his individual needs. Herein lies the challenge. Ed-
ucators must cease being preoccupied with having a smoothly func-
tioning system, and instead, must refocus their attention on the in-
dividual student. In the process of doing this, new teaching phil-
osophies will have to be formulated to take into consideration the
purpose of education: to train the individual to cope with his envi-
ronment. These, together with placement and evaluative tools that
more accurately reflect the child's ability to function within his own
environment, will do much to ensure that each child receives an ap-
propriate education. In addition, concerted and continuing lobby-
ing efforts by parents and interested persons are necessary to guar-
antee that there is adequate funding for such endeavors and that
the program devised for each child does, in truth, serve his needs.
If this occurs, then we will be doing far more than sheltering the
handicapped child, hoping for him, dreaming for him, and loving
him. We will be helping him maximize his potential as a human be-
ing.
Roberta S. Stick '76
